


Temporal Resolution of Uncertainty and Recursive Models of Ambiguity Aversion



Tomasz Strzalecki
Harvard University

Preference for Earlier Resolution of Uncertainty




- instrumental value of information Spence Zeckhauser (1972)
- intrinsic value of information Kreps Porteus (1978)
- hidden actions Ergin Sarver (2012)

Aversion to Persistence/Long Term Risk




Duffie Epstein (1992)

Ambiguity



Kenes (1921), Ellsberg (1961)

Ambiguity



Kenes (1921), Ellsberg (1961)

Ambiguity

50 B	? B
50 R	? R

Kenes (1921), Ellsberg (1961)

Ambiguity

50 B
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Kenes (1921), Ellsberg (1961)

Ambiguity

50 B
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Kenes (1921), Ellsberg (1961)

Ambiguity

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Kenes (1921), Ellsberg (1961)

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

B

||

R

Kenes (1921), Ellsberg (1961)

Ambiguity



Kenes (1921), Ellsberg (1961)

Main Message: modeling tradeoffs

The way we choose to model ambiguity aversion will impact:

- preference for earlier resolution of uncertainty
- aversion to long-run risk,

so the model ties these dimensions of preference together

Similar to the modeling tradeoff in Epstein Zin (1989), where

- risk aversion
- intertemporal elasticity of substitution
- preference for earlier resolution of uncertainty and aversion to long-run risk

are tied together

Preferences

$$V_t = u(c_t) + \beta E(V_{t+1})$$

Discounted Expected Utility

Preferences

$$V_t = u(c_t) + \beta E(V_{t+1})$$

$$V_t = W(u(c_t), E(V_{t+1}))$$

Discounted Expected Utility

Kreps–Porteus, Epstein–Zin

Preferences

$$V_t = u(c_t) + \beta E(V_{t+1})$$

Discounted Expected Utility

$$V_t = W(u(c_t), E(V_{t+1}))$$

Kreps–Porteus, Epstein–Zin

$$V_t = u(c_t) + \beta I(V_{t+1})$$

Discounted Ambiguity Aversion

Preferences

$$V_t = u(c_t) + \beta E(V_{t+1}) \quad \text{Discounted Expected Utility}$$

this γ is indifferent to timing and to long run risks

Preferences

$$V_t = W(u(c_t), E(V_{t+1})) \quad \text{Kreps-Porteus, Epstein-Zin}$$

$$\text{this } \succsim \text{ is } \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{PERU} \\ \text{PLRU} \\ \text{IERU} \end{array} \right\} \text{ iff } W(u, \cdot) \text{ is } \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{convex} \\ \text{concave} \\ \text{linear} \end{array} \right\}$$

Preferences

$$V_t = u(c_t) + \beta I(V_{t+1}) \quad \text{Discounted Ambiguity Aversion}$$

- here the operator I replaces expectation
- captures ambiguity aversion
- question: how does PERU depend on I

Setting

Setting

$\mathcal{T} = \{0, 1, \dots, T\}$ — discrete time, $T < \infty$


(S, Σ) — shocks, measurable space

$\Omega = S^{\mathcal{T}}$ — states of nature

X — consequences, convex subset of a real vector space

$h = (h_0, h_1, \dots, h_T)$ — consumption plan, $h_t : S^t \rightarrow X$

Consumption Plan



IID uncertainty with EU

$$V_t(s^t, h) = u(h_t(s^t)) + \beta \int_{\mathcal{S}} V_{t+1}((s^t, s_{t+1}), h) dp(s_{t+1} | s^t)$$

IID uncertainty with EU

$$V_t(s^t, h) = u(h_t(s^t)) + \beta \int_{\mathcal{S}} V_{t+1}((s^t, s_{t+1}), h) d\rho(s_{t+1} | s^t)$$

$$V_t(s^t, h) = u(h_t(s^t)) + \beta \int_{\mathcal{S}} V_{t+1}((s^t, s_{t+1}), h) d\rho(s_{t+1})$$

IID uncertainty with EU

$$V_t(s^t, h) = u(h_t(s^t)) + \beta \int_{\mathcal{S}} V_{t+1}((s^t, s_{t+1}), h) dp(s_{t+1} | s^t)$$

$$V_t(s^t, h) = u(h_t(s^t)) + \beta \int_{\mathcal{S}} V_{t+1}((s^t, s_{t+1}), h) dp(s_{t+1})$$

- what is IID is the underlying state process s^t

IID uncertainty with EU

$$V_t(s^t, h) = u(h_t(s^t)) + \beta \int_{\mathcal{S}} V_{t+1}((s^t, s_{t+1}), h) dp(s_{t+1} | s^t)$$

$$V_t(s^t, h) = u(h_t(s^t)) + \beta \int_{\mathcal{S}} V_{t+1}((s^t, s_{t+1}), h) dp(s_{t+1})$$

- what is IID is the underlying state process s^t
- consumption can have correlation

generalize beyond EU

$$V_t(s^t, h) = u(h_t(s^t)) + \beta \int_{\mathcal{S}} V_{t+1}((s^t, s_{t+1}), h) d\rho(s_{t+1})$$

generalize beyond EU

$$V_t(s^t, h) = u(h_t(s^t)) + \beta \int_{\mathcal{S}} V_{t+1}((s^t, s_{t+1}), h) d\rho(s_{t+1})$$

$$V_t(s^t, h) = u(h_t(s^t)) + \beta I \left(V_{t+1}((s^t, \cdot), h) \right)$$

where $I : \mathbb{R}^{\mathcal{S}} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$

generalize beyond EU

$$V_t(s^t, h) = u(h_t(s^t)) + \beta \int_{\mathcal{S}} V_{t+1}((s^t, s_{t+1}), h) d\rho(s_{t+1})$$

$$V_t(s^t, h) = u(h_t(s^t)) + \beta I\left(V_{t+1}((s^t, \cdot), h)\right)$$

where $I : \mathbb{R}^{\mathcal{S}} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$

I constant over time—IID Ambiguity (Epstein and Schneider, 2003)

Uncertainty Averse Preferences

$I : \mathbb{R}^S \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is:

- continuous (supnorm)
 - monotonic ($\forall_{s \in S} \xi(s) \geq \zeta(s) \Rightarrow I(\xi) \geq I(\zeta)$)
 - normalized ($\forall_{r \in \mathbb{R}} I(r) = r$)
 - quasiconcave
- Uncertainty Aversion (Schmeidler, 1989)

Axiomatic foundations: Cerreia-Vioglio, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Montrucchio (2011)

special cases

1. *Maxmin expected utility:* $I(\xi) = \min_{p \in C} \int \xi \, dp$
2. *Variational:* $I(\xi) = \min_{p \in \Delta(\Sigma)} \left[\int \xi \, dp + c(p) \right]$
3. *Multiplier:* $I(\xi) = \min_{p \in \Delta(\Sigma)} \left[\int \xi \, dp + \theta R(p \parallel q) \right]$
4. *Confidence:* $I(\xi) = \min_{\{p \in \Delta(\Sigma) \mid \varphi(p) \geq \alpha\}} \left[\frac{1}{\varphi(p)} \int \xi \, dp \right]$
5. *Second order expected utility:* $I(\xi) = \phi^{-1} \left(\int \phi(\xi) \, dp \right)$
6. *Smooth ambiguity:* $I(\xi) = \phi^{-1} \left(\int_{\Delta(\Sigma)} \phi \left(\int \xi \, dp \right) \, d\mu(p) \right)$

special cases

1. *Maxmin expected utility*: Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)
2. *Variational*: Marinacci, Maccheroni, and Rustichini (2006)
3. *Multiplier*: Hansen and Sargent (2001)
4. *Confidence*: Chateauneuf and Faro (2009)
5. *Second order expected utility*: Neilson (1993)
6. *Smooth ambiguity*: Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukherhi (2005)

relations between them

- $\text{MEU} \subset \text{Variational}$
- $\text{MEU} \subset \text{Confidence}$
- $\text{Variational} \cap \text{Confidence} = \text{MEU}$
- $\text{Multiplier} \subset \text{Variational}$
- $\text{SOEU} \cap \text{Variational} = \text{Multiplier}$
- $\text{SOEU} \subset \text{KMM}$

two key properties

- $I(\xi + k) = I(\xi) + k$ for all $\xi \in \mathbb{R}^S, k \in \mathbb{R}$
 - shift invariance, Constant Absolute Ambiguity Aversion (Variational)
- $I(\beta\xi) = \beta I(\xi)$ for all $\xi \in \mathbb{R}^S, \beta \in (0, 1)$
 - scale invariance, Constant Relative Ambiguity Aversion (Confidence)
- so MEU has both

Discounted Uncertainty Averse Preferences

define by backward induction

$$V_T(s^T, h) := u(h_T(s^T))$$

$$V_t(s^t, h) := u(h_t(s^t)) + \beta l\left(V_{t+1}((s^t, \cdot), h)\right); \quad t = 0, \dots, T-1$$

so Dynamically Consistent:

- Sarin and Wakker (1998)
- Epstein and Schneider (2003)
- Marinacci, Maccheroni, and Rustichini (2006)
- Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukherhi (2009)

(without a fixed filtration, well known problems with DC)

Applications to macroeconomics and finance

Dow and Werlang (1992), Epstein and Wang (1994), Chen and Epstein (2002), Epstein and Schneider (2007, 2008), Drechsler (2009), Ilut (2009), Mandler (2013), Condie Ganguli (2014),


Maenhout (2004), Karantounias, Hansen, and Sargent (2009), Kleshchelski and Vincent (2009), Barillas, Hansen, and Sargent (2009)

Ju and Miao (2012), Chen, Ju, and Miao (2009), Hansen (2007), Collard, Mukerji, Sheppard, and Tallon (2011), Benigno and Nisticò (2009)


Results

Main Message

What we assume about I will have impact on Preference for Earlier Resolution of Uncertainty.




ambiguity
averse
preferences



*ambiguity
aversion
preferences*

*timing
indifference*



timing
indifference

*ambiguity
averse
preferences*


•MEU

Theorem 1. A family of discounted uncertainty averse preferences satisfies indifference to timing of resolution of uncertainty if and only if $I(\xi) = \min_{p \in C} \int \xi dp$.

Proof

- indifference to timing \Rightarrow shift-invariance **and** scale-invariance
- shift-invariance and scale-invariance \Rightarrow MEU

Proof




Proof

$$V \left(\begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} x \\ \diagup \quad \diagdown \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} x \\ \diagup \quad \diagdown \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \begin{array}{c} y \\ z \\ y \\ z \end{array} \right) = x + \beta I \left(\begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} x + \beta I \left(\begin{array}{c} y \\ z \end{array} \right) \\ \begin{array}{c} x + \beta I \left(\begin{array}{c} y \\ z \end{array} \right) \end{array} \end{array} \right)$$

Proof

$$\begin{aligned} V \left(\begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} y \\ x \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} x \\ \begin{array}{c} y \\ z \end{array} \end{array} \right) &= x + \beta I \left(\begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} y \\ x + \beta I \left(\begin{array}{c} y \\ z \end{array} \right) \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} x + \beta I \left(\begin{array}{c} y \\ z \end{array} \right) \end{array} \end{array} \right) \\ &= x + \beta \left(x + \beta I \left(\begin{array}{c} y \\ z \end{array} \right) \right) \end{aligned}$$

Proof



Proof

$$V \left(\begin{array}{c} \\ \\ x \\ \\ \\ \end{array} \begin{array}{c} \\ \\ \\ x \\ \\ \end{array} \begin{array}{c} \\ \\ \\ \\ y \\ y \\ z \\ z \end{array} \right) = x + \beta I \left(\begin{array}{c} \\ \\ \\ \\ x + \beta I \left(\begin{array}{c} \\ \\ y \\ y \end{array} \right) \\ \\ x + \beta I \left(\begin{array}{c} \\ \\ z \\ z \end{array} \right) \\ \end{array} \right)$$

Proof

$$V \left(\begin{array}{c} \\ \\ x \\ \\ \\ \end{array} \right) = x + \beta I \left(\begin{array}{c} \\ \\ x + \beta I \left(\begin{array}{c} \\ \\ y \\ \\ y \end{array} \right) \\ \\ x + \beta I \left(\begin{array}{c} \\ \\ z \\ \\ z \end{array} \right) \\ \end{array} \right)$$

$$= x + \beta I \left(\begin{array}{c} \\ \\ x + \beta y \\ \\ x + \beta z \\ \end{array} \right)$$

Proof

$$x + \beta \left(x + \beta I \left(\begin{array}{l} y \\ z \end{array} \right) \right)$$

$$x + \beta I \left(\begin{array}{l} x + \beta y \\ x + \beta z \end{array} \right)$$

Proof

$$x + \beta I \left(\begin{array}{l} y \\ z \end{array} \right)$$

$$I \left(\begin{array}{l} x + \beta y \\ x + \beta z \end{array} \right)$$

Proof

we have:

$$\exists_{\beta \in (0,1)} \forall_{x \in \mathbb{R}} \forall_{\xi \in \mathbb{R}^s} \quad x + \beta I(\xi) = I(x + \beta \xi)$$

Proof

we have:

$$\exists_{\beta \in (0,1)} \forall_{x \in \mathbb{R}} \forall_{\xi \in \mathbb{R}^s} \quad x + \beta I(\xi) = I(x + \beta \xi)$$

need to show:

$$\forall_{\beta \in (0,1)} \forall_{x \in \mathbb{R}} \forall_{\xi \in \mathbb{R}^s} \quad x + \beta I(\xi) = I(x + \beta \xi)$$

(details in the paper)





comments


- in some sense this argument could be used to axiomatize the recursive multiple priors model
- a related paper by Kochov (2012) axiomatizes MEU using a strong version of Stationarity, which has a flavor of IERU

Comparison to Risk


- Chew Epstein (1989) show IERU \Rightarrow EU
- Grant Kajii Polak (2000) show (rank-dependent or betweenness) + PERU \Rightarrow EU
- so dispensing with objective probability makes more room










Theorem 2. A family of discounted variational preferences, $I(\xi) = \min_{p \in \Delta(\Sigma)} \int \xi \, dp + c(p)$, always satisfies preference toward earlier resolution of uncertainty.











Theorem 3. A family of discounted confidence preferences, $I(\xi) = \min_{\{p \in \Delta(\Sigma) | \varphi(p) \geq \alpha\}} \frac{1}{\varphi(p)} \int \xi \, dp$, displays a preference for earlier resolution of uncertainty if and only if $I(\xi) = \min_{p \in C} \int \xi \, dp$.








Theorem 4. A family of discounted second order expected utility preferences $I(\xi) = \phi^{-1}(\int \phi(\xi) dp)$ with ϕ concave, strictly increasing and twice differentiable displays a preference for earlier resolution of uncertainty iff Condition 1 holds.


Condition 1. There exists a real number $A > 0$ such that $-\frac{\phi''(x)}{\phi'(x)} \in [\beta A, A]$ for all $x \in \mathbb{R}$

(this condition means that the curvature of ϕ doesn't vary too much)











Theorem 5. A family of discounted smooth ambiguity preferences $I(\xi) = \phi^{-1}\left(\int_{\Delta(\Sigma)} \phi\left(\int \xi d\rho\right) d\mu(\rho)\right)$ with ϕ concave, strictly increasing and twice differentiable displays a preference for earlier resolution of uncertainty if Condition 1 holds

Only if under additional assumption on the support of μ .

Persistence



Persistence

Theorem 6. A family of discounted variational preferences, $I(\xi) = \min_{p \in \Delta(\Sigma)} \int \xi \, dp + c(p)$, always satisfies preference for iid.

A family of discounted confidence preferences, $I(\xi) = \min_{\{p \in \Delta(\Sigma) \mid \varphi(p) \geq \alpha\}} \frac{1}{\varphi(p)} \int \xi \, dp$, always satisfies preference for iid.

In both cases, indifference to iid is satisfied if and only if $I(\xi) = \min_{p \in C} \int \xi \, dp$.

(I do not know how to extend this result to all of I)

Aggregator

Aggregator

$$V_t(s^t, h) = u(h_t(s^t)) + \beta I(V_{t+1}((s^t, \cdot), h))$$

Aggregator

$$V_t(s^t, h) = u(h_t(s^t)) + \beta I(V_{t+1}((s^t, \cdot), h))$$

$$V_t(s^t, h) = W\left(h_t(s^t), I(V_{t+1}((s^t, \cdot), h))\right)$$

where $W : X \times \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$

Recursive Uncertainty Averse Preferences


$$V_T(s^T, h) = v(h_T(s^T))$$

$$V_t(s^t, h) = W\left(h_t(s^t), I\left(V_{t+1}((s^t, \cdot), h)\right)\right); \quad t = 0, \dots, T-1$$


Question

(I^{MEU}, W^{disc})


Question




Question



Question



Question



relation between the two models

- both W and I induce PERU
- but save for the case above, they are different \approx
- do they fit the data in a different way?
- W —workhorse model of macrofinance (Epstein–Zin)
- what does I add?

recent work: Epstein, Farhi, Strzalecki (2014)

- suppose you are endowed with a consumption process h_t
- for what $\pi \in (0, 1)$ are you indifferent between

$$[h_t, \text{gradual resolution}] \sim [(1 - \pi)h_t, \text{early resolution}]$$

- $\pi \in (20\%, 40\%)$ for workhorse models in finance using Epstein–Zin preferences (Bansal and Yaron 2004; Barro, 2009)
- how high is this number for models of ambiguity?

Conclusion:

interdependence of ambiguity and timing

MEU—only case of indifference

Questions:

theoretical: is this it? can we disentangle more?

empirical: how to measure this?

Thank you

