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Zachary Holbrook

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Happiness, Truth, Justice and The Good Life
in Plato's Republic.*

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RAMSEY PRATHER

Layout and Production Editor

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Address submissions and inquiries to:

Bard Journal of Social Sciences

P.O. Box 37

Annandale-on-Hudson, NY 12504

Email: bjss@bard.edu

Phone: (845) 758-7059

Contents

Zachary Holbrook THE RHETORIC OF URGENCY <i>A Comparison of Demosthenes' First Philippic and Charles Fox's Speech to the House of Commons</i>	3
Michael Canham AFRICA AND GLOBALIZATION <i>Prospects for a Sustainable Growth</i>	II
Micaela Morriessette NO PLACE LIKE HOME <i>Metaphors of Community in Chicana Literature</i>	17
Marc Wallerstein MORE THAN HE BARGAINED FOR <i>An Answer to Trbasymachus: Materialism, Passion, Fulfillment, Enlightenment, Happiness, Truth, Justice, and The Good Life in Plato's REPULIC</i>	30
Vanda Papp and Gyorgy Toth DISZKÓ, TECHNO, TOPP FÍLING <i>A Case Study of the Influence of English in the Language of Hungarian Popular Culture</i>	40
Zoltan Feher NATO'S NEW PLACE IN THE EUROPEAN SECURITYARCHITECTURE.....	46

NATO's New Place in the European Security Architecture

Introduction

As an integral part of NATO's transformation of its mission, the Atlantic Alliance has acquired a new place and role in the evolving European security architecture. In fact, NATO has taken an active role in building up this new architecture. Both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the institutions of European political and security integration (EU, WEU) wanted to redefine the participation of European countries in NATO and in the European security system. Besides the reform made necessary by the end of the bipolar international order, the parties on both sides had important reasons for wanting to change NATO's role in Europe. On the one hand, the United States wanted its European allies to take a larger share of the burdens of securing peace and stability in their own continent. On the other hand, the European members of NATO, most of whom are also members of the European Union and the Western European Union, have sought to increase their influence in NATO's decision-making since the 1960s. In addition, since the second half of the 1980s, these countries have worked towards creating a more independent European security identity by strengthening the European pillar of NATO.¹

These two sets of expectations, that of the U.S. and that of its European allies, had to be harmonized in a way that would produce a new European security system which is separable for missions of distinctly European nature but which is not fully separate from NATO. *Separable but not separate* – this is how the policymakers of NATO and the WEU characterized the Combined Joint Task Force in 1994, a military initiative that has come to play an important role in the process of building a European security identity within NATO. *Separable but not separate* – this expression also characterizes the overall policy of an evolving, partially independent European security iden-

tity in strong cooperation with (and partly within) the Atlantic Alliance.²

In this new European security structure that emerged in the 1990s, NATO still plays a decisive role, while allowing the institutions of a separable European security identity to manage those issues that can be best handled within Europe without the active participation of the U.S. or NATO. In this new architecture, participants have during the last decade had to learn the names of such new institutions or initiatives as the European Union, the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the European Security and Defense Identity, the European Security and Defense Policy, and the Combined Joint Task Force, while they first had to learn again and then gradually forget the name of the Western European Union. All of these institutions and initiatives have played important roles in the last decade.³

The issues of NATO–EU relations, NATO–WEU relations, EU–WEU relations, the European Security and Defense Identity, the European Security and Defense Policy, the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and the Combined Joint Task Force are all interrelated and partially overlapping in some cases. As Nigel Baker, a Head of Department in the United Kingdom's Foreign and Commonwealth Office, phrased in his lecture on *EU, WEU and NATO*: "We live in a world with complicated multilateral structures, organizations with overlapping roles, different memberships and over-bureaucratized relationships. Such structures are particularly prolific in the security arena. The area of overlap between them is a never-ending source of study, speculation and friction."⁴ Therefore, the overlap makes it nearly impossible to separate these issues. In order to clarify the events in the Transatlantic and European security scene in the last twelve years, we nevertheless need to separate these nearly inseparable topics, insti-

tutions, and initiatives, so as to link them again at the end and see the whole picture.

Nato's European Shadow: The Western European Union

The relationship between NATO and the Western European Union (WEU) is characteristic of the history of the efforts for European security by the United States and its Western European allies since 1945. The origins of both NATO and the WEU can be traced back to "the Brussels Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defense of 1948, signed by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom".⁵ Both institutions (NATO, WEU) grew out of this landmark treaty that greatly influenced the European security situation in the second part of the twentieth century. "The Treaty was the first formal step undertaken by the European powers towards the establishment of the North Atlantic Alliance".⁶ The organization established by the treaty, which later came to be called the Western European Union, was named Brussels Treaty Organization (also referred to as Western Union). This union was made insignificant by the establishment of NATO: "Following the signature of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, the exercise of the military responsibilities of the Brussels Treaty Organisation, or Western Union, was transferred to the North Atlantic Alliance, in 1951".⁷

However, a few years later, the Brussels Treaty Organization was revived in a different form despite its disappearance from the scene of international politics. As Gazdag claims, the Paris Agreements of 1954 shaped up the postwar structure of Western Europe.⁸ Instead of fading away entirely, new countries joined the Brussels Treaty Organization: "Under the Paris Agreements of 1954, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy acceded to the Brussels Treaty and the Organization was renamed the Western European Union."⁹ The Paris Agreements set forth the framework of cooperation between the signing parties in basically all fields of intergovernmental relations (security-military, political, economic, cultural, social cooperation), and assigned the WEU with the task of coordinating these activities.

According to the Paris Agreements, the main political bodies and officers of the WEU, which showed similarities to NATO's respective structures, were: (i) the Council met at the ministerial level twice a year, and at the ambassadorial level at demand; (ii) the Secretary General directed the Secretariat of the WEU; (iii) the General Assembly of WEU, meeting twice a year, consisted of those members of national parliaments who sat in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.¹⁰ Despite the finely established structure and frame of activities of the WEU, the Union came to the same fate as its predecessor, the Brussels Treaty Organization. In European cooperation, NATO handled security and political questions, economic integration was built within the framework of several structures (OEEC/OECD, Montanunion, EEC, Euratom), and the cultural and social issues were taken over by the Council of Europe from 1960.¹¹ As a result, the WEU faded from the international political scene for decades.

When the political circumstances demanded, the WEU, the 'Sleeping Beauty' of European political integration, awakened in the middle of the 1980s. "The Western European Union was reactivated in 1984 with a view to developing a common European defence identity through cooperation among its members in the security field and strengthening the European pillar of the North Atlantic Alliance".¹² That is, the WEU's revival was strongly motivated by the demand to increase the role of European countries in NATO and by the demand to build up a common European security policy and defense identity (which later developed into CFSP and ESDI). In 1987, the representatives of WEU member states assembled in The Hague and adopted a declaration stating that European integration could only become complete by extending to the field of security and defense.¹³ The WEU therefore assumed an important role for itself in the process of European security integration.

In 1992, at a landmark meeting of the Union, the representatives of WEU member states

adopted the *Petersberg Declaration*. "In June 1992, Foreign and Defence Ministers of WEU member states met near Bonn to strengthen further the role of the WEU and issued the 'Petersberg Declaration'. This set out, on the basis of the Maastricht decisions, the guidelines for the organisation's future development".¹⁴ The declaration's aim was similar to that of NATO's Strategic Concepts as it outlined the direction of where the organization wished to go. In the document, the WEU, following its "older/bigger brother" NATO, declared its intention to actively participate in the actions of the international community for building peace and stability in the Balkans. "In the Declaration, WEU members pledged their support for conflict prevention and peacekeeping efforts in cooperation with the then CSCE and with the United Nations Security Council."¹⁵ At the Petersberg meeting, the WEU's members moreover defined how to make the Union a security organization capable of carrying out concrete operations of crisis management out of an organization of primarily consultative functions. "As part of the efforts to strengthen the operational role of WEU, it was decided that a WEU Planning Cell should be set up."¹⁶ The intention of improving the operational capabilities of the WEU was paired up with that of providing the necessary military conditions for the creation of a separable European defense identity. "WEU members also declared that they were prepared to make available military units from the whole spectrum of their conventional armed forces for military tasks conducted under the authority of the WEU".¹⁷ Finally and most importantly, the foreign and defense ministers of WEU member states defined the so-called *Petersberg tasks*, i.e. those missions in which military units of WEU countries could be applied under European leadership (which then meant: under the authority of the WEU). The Petersberg tasks are "in three categories, namely humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; and tasks assigned to combat forces in the context of crisis management situations, including peacemaking."¹⁸ The cooperation between NATO and the WEU was intensi-

fied in the first half of the 1990s. Both organizations felt the need for stronger and closer cooperation with one another since it was becoming clear that the future security architecture would be built by the common effort of "mutually reinforcing organizations." In "May 1992, the Council of the Western European Union held its first formal meeting with the North Atlantic Council at NATO Headquarters. In accordance with decisions taken by both organizations, the meeting was held to discuss their relationship and ways of strengthening cooperation as well as establishing closer working ties between them."¹⁹ To improve the operational work of the WEU and the relations between the two organizations, NATO and the WEU initiated joint work in a military operation: "In June 1992, the member countries of the WEU decided to make available naval forces for monitoring compliance in the Adriatic with UN Security Council Resolutions relating to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia... Similar measures were taken by the North Atlantic Council... [in] July 1992, in coordination and cooperation with the operation decided by the WEU."²⁰

As a result, the WEU became a kind of "European shadow" of NATO by mirroring the activities and processes undertaken by the Atlantic Alliance. The two organizations developed the principles of their cooperation. At the Summit Meeting held in Brussels in January 1994, "NATO Heads of State and Government... welcomed the close and growing cooperation between NATO and the Western European Union (WEU), achieved on the basis of agreed principles of complementarity and transparency."²¹ The cooperation between NATO and the WEU had the capability of further extending into new areas and levels: "Meeting in Brussels in December 1995, NATO Foreign Ministers... stated their expectation of a deepening of mutually beneficial NATO-WEU cooperation in the areas of intelligence, strategic mobility and logistics, which would help in developing the WEU's operational capability."²² The next step in this process was the final adoption of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept in 1996 that put the ex-

pectations expressed in the December 1995 statement into practical planning.²³

Although the WEU was the major European institutional partner for NATO in security affairs in the first half of the 1990s, the fact that the EU-led process of European integration was reaching to security and defense policy changed this situation. The need for the WEU's merger into the European Union became more and more obvious, and the WEU has gradually lost its political significance during the second half of the 1990s. The meeting of the European Council in Cologne in June 1999 adopted a declaration that stated that most of the WEU's tasks should be integrated into the European Union by the end of 2000.²⁴ The Council furthermore declared, "in that event, the WEU as an organization would have completed its purpose."²⁵ The WEU Ministerial Council issued the *Marseille Declaration* in November 2000 in which they decided to cease the activities of most of their institutional bodies, and to hand over the WEU's tasks, responsibilities and missions to the European Union as agreed. With the *Marseille Declaration*, the Western European Union practically declared its own dissolution.

The Combined Joint Task Forces

The military structures of NATO in the early 1990s still reflected the security situation under the Cold War. Even though NATO would have been capable of defending its members from any attack coming from the Soviet bloc, this was not the main security threat for the West in 1990 any longer. With the end of Cold War military hostility, a new, different and complex set of threats was arising. The United States and its Western European allies had to prepare for different types of threats and crises than those experienced during the decades of the Cold War; international terrorism, international organized crime, drug trafficking, ethnic and religious conflicts, wars for independence, civil wars, destruction of the environment, political or social instability, and mass migration became the main sources of security threats in the early 1990s.²⁶

As the countries of NATO had to adapt

their policies and structures in politics and in the economy to the changed environment, they had to take similar measures in military affairs as well. The idea of building a flexible, joint, rapid reaction force within NATO, which could work effectively in widely different military applications (peace-building, peacekeeping, traditional defense, etc.), arose early in the 1990s. The new structure was to be *combined*, i.e. consisting of soldiers from several countries, because the plan was aimed at the more active military participation of European NATO countries and the inclusion of new democracies in common operations in the future.²⁷ This new force had to be capable of handling multidimensional situations (on land, in water, in air) – therefore it had to be a *joint* force, i.e. including units of marine, air force and land troops as well.²⁸ The initiative set forth that NATO needed a *task force*, i.e. a structure that could be easily built up for a certain mission in a given situation.²⁹ As a result of these demands, the new concept came to be known as the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF).

The concept of the Combined Joint Task Force was first discussed officially at the informal meeting of the Defense Ministers of NATO countries, and was decided upon at the NATO Summit Meeting in January 1994.³⁰ The final adoption of CJTF took place at the meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of NATO countries on June 3, 1996.³¹ As Martinusz argues, the CJTF concept was an integral part of NATO's adaptation to the new security and political environment since it would enable the Alliance to complete operations of crisis management, peace enforcement, or even collective security, in more effective and flexible ways.³² Although its main aim at first was the military adaptation of NATO to the new security environment, it soon became clear that the Combined Joint Task Force could serve two other important purposes. First of all, since many of the security threats of the post-bipolar international order were coming from the eastern part of Europe, NATO had to actively involve some of the more stable new democracies in its activities, and CJTF provided an ideal frame-

work for this. Cooperating in CJTF with NATO countries was also supposed to give new democracies an opportunity to learn and practice NATO procedures, terminology, and technology. Secondly, the Combined Joint Task Force was a valuable tool for the stronger cooperation between NATO and European security institutions (WEU, EU).

Indeed, the timing and the contents of the Combined Joint Task Force were ideal for the extension of cooperation between Transatlantic and integrated European security institutions. As Martinusz points out, NATO through the CJTF also aimed at providing the necessary military conditions for building up the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI).³³ The 1994 concept set forth that CJTFs could be led by NATO or the Western European Union, depending on the given security situation to be resolved. Since the possibility that the new force could be led by WEU in certain cases worried American and Canadian military leaders, the policymakers worked out a precise system of guarantees to neutralize these worries. With the guarantees built in, the CJTF concept meant great development in the process of establishing a European security identity within NATO.³⁴

In 1994, the European defense identity was mainly envisioned in the framework of the WEU. The concept set out that the CJTF Commands be primarily established in the frame of NATO Commands. However, in the case of a CJTF operation led by the WEU, some Commands could be built up in the frame of WEU military structures.³⁵ This also meant that the WEU could use NATO equipment and technology, so NATO could provide logistical background for the building up of the European defense identity.³⁶ As the WEU has since been integrated into the European Union, the roles of the WEU in regard to CJTF have also been gradually taken over by the respective EU structures, thus rendering the Combined Joint Task Forces the practical application of NATO-EU security cooperation.

The NATO-WEU-EU Triangle

Since the end of the 1980s, European security and defense policy has been determined by three international organizations, namely NATO, the European Union (formerly European Community), and the Western European Union. The policies defining the security cooperation and integration of European countries have been shaped in the NATO-WEU-EU institutional triangle. The system of relationships among these three organizations was always complex and also went through many changes in the 1990s. As Molnár claims: "Elaborating on this issue could be the subject of a seminar given its complexity. This is not only an institutional question but also that of roles, competence, and related capabilities."³⁷ Recognizing the complexities and overlaps in their cooperation, even the officials of these organizations began referring to this triangle with the expression of 'mutually reinforcing organizations'.

The relationship between NATO and the WEU was introduced in detail above, and mention was made of certain elements of the WEU-EU relationship. However, some key elements of the latter have not been mentioned and need to be introduced here. In 1987, the WEU meeting held in The Hague adopted a declaration stating that European integration could only become complete by being extended to the field of security and defense.³⁸ The WEU therefore assumed an important role for itself in the process of European security integration. Until the end of 1991, the WEU remained the principal institutional framework of European security integration that was then in its early childhood.

At the meetings in Maastricht in December 1991, many questions about the future European security architecture were decided upon in the frame of different political forums. The Heads of State and Government of the countries belonging to the European Community adopted the landmark Maastricht Treaty and thus formed the European Union. The Maastricht Treaty further-

more declared that the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) would become one of the three pillars of the Union, fulfilling the demands of WEU's Hague declaration of 1987 mentioned above.³⁹ In Maastricht at the same time, the decision-makers of the Western European Union also assembled and arrived at important conclusions. "At the meeting of the WEU Member States... in Maastricht in December 1991, at the same time as the meeting of the European Council, a declaration was issued inviting members of the future European Union to accede to the WEU or to become observers, and inviting other European members of NATO to become associate members of the WEU".⁴⁰

The fact that the meeting of the EC/EU and the WEU happened simultaneously was no coincidence. The leaders of both organizations intended to initiate a new phase in their cooperation that would be marked by steps towards bringing the two unions closer at the working level. On the one hand, the WEU, as mentioned above, invited all EU members to join the WEU. On the other hand, the founders of the EU declared in the Maastricht Treaty that the WEU played an important role in the European integration process. The document "refers to the Western European Union as an integral part of the development of the European Union and requests the WEU to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications."⁴¹

As can be seen above, there are many phenomena that interlink the organizations of the NATO-WEU-EU institutional triangle. An important issue in the history of all three organizations is their transformation and adaptation to the changed political and security environment in the 1990s, which also took place simultaneously. "Following the profound political and social changes in Central and Eastern Europe all the integration structures had to face the challenge of adapting to the new situation, to re-define former relations and open up towards the new democracies."⁴² These transformation processes took different shapes in the different organiza-

tions but their direction and focus was the same. The leadership of all three organizations recognized that the changed security environment demanded opening towards new democracies, creating new structures for broader consultations, and enlargement.

In the first half of the 1990s, all three organizations took several steps for opening up towards Central and Eastern European new democracies. NATO established the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) on December 20, 1991. Twenty-five countries became founding members, 16 of them NATO Allies. The members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) soon joined the NACC, as did Georgia and Albania in 1992 and Slovenia in 1996. In 1996, the NACC had 39 members and 5 observers.⁴³ The European Union opened towards new democracies as well. Following the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty in 1991, the EU signed 'Europe Agreements' with ten Central and Eastern European or Baltic countries. "In June 1993, the European Council announced that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe which had signed 'Europe Agreements' with the Union would eventually be invited to become EU members."⁴⁴ The Union has since then involved all the countries wishing to join it in its consultative mechanisms in all fields.

The WEU also took similar measures for opening up towards new democracies. "In a move that to some extent mirrored NATO's outreach strategy, the WEU gradually developed a differentiated and far-reaching system of participation in its decision-making processes for states that are not full members... As a result, it has evolved into a comprehensive forum for dialogue."⁴⁵ As the first step towards this expansion into an institution of broad cooperation, the Western European Union improved the level of interaction and dialogue with the leading Central and Eastern European new democracies. "As part of their cooperation with Central and Eastern European countries, the WEU Council of Ministers invited the Foreign and Defence Ministers of eight states (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary,

Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania) to join the WEU's Forum of Consultation, which met for the first time in October 1992."⁴⁶

As a further step of opening and cooperation, NATO launched the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program at the Brussels Summit in January 1994. By 1996, 27 states joined the program. The Western European Union followed the path that NATO and the EU had built up by extending and deepening the forms of cooperation with the former Communist countries from mere consultation to partnership (NATO's Partnership for Peace, the EU's associate membership): "In May 1994... the WEU Council of Ministers issued the 'Kirchberg Declaration', according the nine Central and Eastern European members of the Forum of Consultation... the status of Associate Partners, thereby suspending this forum."⁴⁷ Similarly to the suspension of the WEU Forum of Consultation, NATO's North Atlantic Council was also transformed. As a result of the success of PfP, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) replaced the NACC in May 1997. The new Council has 44 members.⁴⁸

The most recent enlargements of the three organizations show simultaneity as well. Spain and Portugal, after their accession to the European Community in 1986, became members of the WEU in 1989. The WEU, as mentioned above, invited future EU members and other European NATO countries to join WEU as full members, associate members or observers.⁴⁹ Only member states of both the EU and NATO could become full members of the Western European Union (as one exception, Denmark did not become one); non-EU members of NATO were to receive associate membership; non-NATO members of EU were given observer status. "At the Rome Ministerial meeting in November 1992, WEU members agreed to enlarge the organization and invited Greece to become the tenth member... Iceland, Norway and Turkey, as member countries of NATO, were granted Associate Member status; and Denmark and Ireland, members of the European Union, became Observers."⁵⁰

The second wave of EU and WEU en-

largement involved non-NATO, formerly "neutral" countries that had newly joined the EU. "With their accession to the European Union on 1 January 1995, and following completion of parliamentary procedures, Austria, Finland and Sweden also became WEU Observers in early 1995."⁵¹ The last phase of enlargement in NATO and the WEU was also closely linked. After the three most developed Central European new democracies had joined the Atlantic Alliance in April 1999, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland became associate members of the Western European Union.⁵² As a result of the close relationship among the three organizations, the membership candidates most likely to join the EU in the first round are those three new democracies who are already members of NATO and the WEU.

From the late 1980s until the end of the 1990s, the Western European Union served both as the security wing of the EC/EU and as NATO's European pillar (without strong defense capabilities). After the fall of Communism, NATO was increasingly seeking ways to delegate responsibilities to its European allies on security while the countries of the EC/EU were gradually extending the process of European integration into the field of foreign policy, security and defense. The WEU, through the intensifying of security cooperation, was gradually becoming the channel through which NATO and the institutions of European integration (EC, EU) negotiated on the making of a European security identity. "The WEU... played an outstanding role by... bridging the two other integration structures."⁵³ This role played by the WEU was becoming increasingly important, as closer cooperation was needed between NATO and the EU. As Schmidt claims, "the WEU was to serve as a bridge between the EU and NATO, keeping these two institutions at arm's length of each other" in order to facilitate this cooperation.⁵⁴

Although the WEU was the major European security partner for both NATO and the EU in the first half of the 1990s, the "spill-over effect" of European integration, i.e. the process that integration in one field motivated and en-

couraged integration in a neighboring field, reached the sphere of security and defense as well. For the WEU, this meant that the need for the organization's merger into the European Union became more and more obvious, and the WEU has gradually lost its political significance during the second half of the 1990s. The meeting of the European Council in Cologne in June 1999 adopted a declaration in which they stated that most of the WEU's tasks should be integrated into the European Union by the end of the year 2000.⁵⁵ As a result, the EU would be able to take over and fulfill the security and defense tasks assigned to it by the Amsterdam Treaty and defined in the WEU's Petersberg Declaration.⁵⁶ The Council furthermore declared, "in that event, the WEU as an organization would have completed its purpose."⁵⁷

As German analyst Peter Schmidt claimed in the Spring/Summer 2000 issue of *NATO Review*: "With the prospective absorption of the WEU into the EU... the EU itself will take on the WEU's functions. Many observers... welcome these developments as a logical step – a long overdue 'tidying up' of Europe's complicated institutional landscape."⁵⁸ The WEU Ministerial Council issued the *Marseille Declaration* in November 2000 in which they decided to cease the activities of most of their institutional bodies, and to hand over the WEU's tasks, responsibilities and missions to the European Union as agreed. With the Marseille Declaration, as expected, the Western European Union practically declared its own dissolution.

Analysts argue that, besides making the institutional landscape more transparent, the WEU also had to disappear because NATO needed a politically strong European institutional partner in security, and the EU could fulfill this demand better than the WEU. To improve the defense capabilities and the efficiency of defense spending of the European allies, "there is... a need to use primarily a European institutional framework, and preferably a powerful one – the EU rather than the single-issue, politically less significant Western European Union (WEU)."⁵⁹

The takeover between the EU and the WEU is a process that, according to the relevant documents, will be finished in 2002. However, a large part of this takeover has already taken effect. British diplomat Nigel Baker created a metaphor to describe this takeover and its implications in his lecture in March 2000. "Looking at the relationship between the EU, the WEU and NATO, I am reminded of a dance at a particularly fine costumed Ball. Think of NATO and the WEU as partners in a stately waltz: NATO as especially vivacious and sprightly blonde; the WEU a slightly moth-eaten Captain-of-Horse. As they whirl round the room, our Captain-of-Horse flagging, NATO spots a new prospective partner enter the room, resplendent in a blue sash with 12 gold stars. Nor can the new arrival, the EU, ignore the NATO belle of the Ball. He steps in, demands the pleasure of the next dance – an energetic Polka – and our new couple take off, to a new rhythm, at greater speed, leaving the WEU to fade into the background."⁶⁰

As a result of the WEU's 'fading into the background' (not for the first time in its history as mentioned), the European security structure will primarily be based on NATO, the EU, and their cooperation. The quality of Europe's security will depend on how the two organizations can cooperate. With Baker's metaphor: "The key point... is that it takes two to Tango... It will not be love at first sight. Both will need to measure up the other. And both will need to consult their friends."⁶¹

The European Security and Defense Identity

The development of a *separable but not separate* European security and defense identity has been an important element in the process of changing NATO's mission in the 1990s. "Strengthening the European identity in security and defense matters (ESDI) became an integral part of the adaptation of NATO's political and military structures."⁶² The Treaty on European Union signed in Maastricht in December 1991 set out the goal of developing a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) for the newly established Union and stated that CFSP would

be one of the three pillars of the EU. The Common Foreign and Security Policy was going to include "the eventual framing of a common defence policy which might in time lead to a common defense."⁶³ The Maastricht Treaty took effect on November 1, 1993. The leaders of NATO at the Brussels Summit in January 1994 greeted the establishment of the European Union and the goal of the founders to increase and improve the participation of the European allies in the sphere of security and defense. NATO from the beginning expressed its support for a European security identity created *within* the framework of the Atlantic Alliance. "At their meetings in Berlin and Brussels in June 1996, NATO Foreign and Defence Ministers decided that the European Security and Defence Identity should be built within NATO, as an essential part of the ongoing internal adaptation of the Alliance."⁶⁴ The revision of the Maastricht Treaty, the Treaty of Amsterdam, adopted in June and signed in October 1997, elaborated on the practical development of a functioning ESDI, and stated that the EU could employ the operative capabilities of the Western European Union when carrying out the so-called 'Petersberg tasks' (humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and crisis management tasks including peacemaking; see in the section on the WEU). The leaders of NATO member states at the Madrid Summit in July 1997 expressed their satisfaction with the actions and initiatives taken by NATO in connection with building up the European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance. These steps towards the creation of ESDI included the arrangements for "forces answerable to the WEU" (FAWEU) or the plans of the Combined Joint Task Forces, in order to enable the European allies under the umbrella of the WEU (or later the EU) to act militarily in case of a crisis to be best solved 'in Europe, by Europe.' "In practice these arrangements would mean that if a crisis arose in which the WEU decided to intervene (and the Alliance chose not to), it would request the use of Alliance assets and capabilities, possibly including a CJTF headquarters, for conducting an operation under its own control and direction."⁶⁵

The year 1998 brought a turning point

in the development of the European Security and Defense Identity and also, more generally, in Transatlantic relations. This turning point meant a change in direction as well as the acceleration of this development through political events happening more and more often around ESDI. After the event that had brought it about, analysts named the new debate on ESDI starting in 1998 "the St. Malo process." At their meeting at St. Malo in December 1998, the leaders of the United Kingdom and France issued a declaration that set forth the creation of a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). According to the declaration, "the European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage," and "to this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces."⁶⁶ These European capabilities would be employed in situations where military action is needed but NATO does not intend to get involved as an Alliance.⁶⁷

The St. Malo Declaration and the idea of ESDP, replacing the original notion of ESDI, received mixed reactions from Atlantic partners. Many American decision-makers and analysts expressed their hopes as well as their concerns about ESDP, and the official reactions of the Atlantic Alliance too were reassuring and warning at the same time. The main concerns expressed by skeptics swirled around defense capabilities and the three D's: duplication, decoupling and discrimination. Few days after St. Malo, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright warned the allies not to "duplicate what was being done effectively in NATO," not to "decouple... the United States from Europe in the Alliance," and not to discriminate "against NATO Allies who were not members of the European Union."⁶⁸ At the Washington Summit in April 1999, where NATO celebrated its 50th anniversary, the documents adopted by the members of the Alliance supported the development of ESDI (not ESDP!) and assured the European allies that NATO would provide the necessary means for autonomous European action if the EU would avoid the three D's. On one hand, NATO's new Strategic Con-

cept, adopted at the Summit, states that the Alliance "will assist the European Allies to act by themselves as required through the readiness of the Alliance... to make its assets and capabilities available for operations in which the Alliance is not engaged militarily."⁶⁹ On the other hand, the Washington Summit Communiqué also expressed that European allies, when taking "the necessary steps to strengthen their defence capabilities," should avoid "unnecessary duplication."⁷⁰

The European Union's Council meeting in Cologne in June 1999 approved the ideas included in the St. Malo Declaration and decided to ensure the necessary capabilities for the Union to implement the Petersberg tasks. In addition, the Cologne meeting set forth that the EU should by the end of 2000 integrate the functions and a part of the assets of the WEU in order to be able to put the emerging ESDI/ESDP into practice. "In that event, the WEU as an organisation would have completed its purpose," and the EU would become the core institutional framework for ESDI.⁷¹ The Helsinki European Council meeting in December 1999 endorsed the ESDP/St. Malo concept and further elaborated on the development of autonomous European defense capabilities. They adopted a "common European headline goal" which set out that the EU should by 2003 be able to deploy a rapid reaction force of 50,000-60,000 troops capable of performing all of the Petersberg missions. The Council also decided that new political and military bodies be set up within the Union – basically replacing the bodies of the ceasing Western European Union.⁷²

In October 1999, former British Minister of Defense George Robertson succeeded Javier Solana in the position of NATO Secretary General. Robertson in his speech at the 45th annual session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly intended to relax American worries about ESDI/ESDP by replacing the *three D's* by the *three I's*: "improvement in European defense capabilities; inclusiveness... for all Allies; and the indivisibility of transatlantic security."⁷³ Robertson's predecessor, *Javier Solana* became EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy

as well as WEU Secretary General in order to assist the smooth takeover between the EU and the WEU, and to further the development of ESDI/ESDP. In November 2000, the WEU Ministerial Council issued the *Marseille Declaration* in which they decided to cease the activities of most of their institutional bodies, and to hand over most of the WEU's tasks, responsibilities and missions to the European Union, including consultations with NATO and other third parties. With the *Marseille Declaration*, Euro-Atlantic security policy-making, with ESDI/ESDP in its center, was placed under the exclusive competence of the interfaces between NATO and the EU.

The history of the European Security and Defense Identity looks back only at the last ten years but its roots go back to previous decades of European integration. Two attempts to establish a framework for common European foreign and/or defense policy have led to fiasco since the end of the 2nd World War. The European Defense Community (EDC) in the early 1950s and the European Political Cooperation (EPC) in 1970 failed to achieve this goal due to lack of consensus.⁷⁴ The latest, and so far highly successful, attempt, the ESDI, has developed parallel to the changing of NATO's mission in the 1990s. The theorists of the spill-over effect of integration have been proven right because European integration, which earlier concentrated on economic, legal, financial, and then political, integration, reached the spheres of security and defense policy as well ("spilled over" to these).

The intentions of the European leaders with the EU's evolving common foreign and security policy were becoming more and more ambitious as the integration deepened and widened. First, it meant mainly the establishment of inter-governmental forums for negotiating over common European foreign policy. As political and military crises arose in South-Eastern Europe, the leaders of EU became conscious of the lack of capacities in Europe to prevent or manage crises of this sort without the dominant participation of the United States. It became obvious that the EU in time should be able to formulate a Euro-

pean Security and Defense Identity within the Atlantic Alliance. As European integration reached the point where even a single European currency was created, the members of the European Union recognized that an independent political entity would require independent defense capacities as well. Common military initiatives like setting up the *Eurocorps* or cooperation on the *Eurofighter* began to take shape.⁷⁵

As a result of the fact that only the United States possessed the political and military capabilities to effectively handle the different Balkan crises, the development of ESDI and of a common defense accelerated. Under a British initiative, the St. Malo Declaration of France and the United Kingdom claimed that there was a need to work out an independent European defense policy (ESDP) and to provide for the necessary military capabilities for the functionality of ESDP. The formulation of this initiative implied that ESDP and the common defense would be fairly *independent from* NATO and the United States – as against the original vision of the ESDI *within* the Alliance. The EU's bodies and member states have since 1999 supported the St. Malo concept numerous times.⁷⁶ In the *Kosovo War* in Spring 1999, the European allies again experienced that their military capabilities were highly inefficient for handling such situations. As a result of the necessity for a dominant U.S. military involvement in the war, the European countries “footed the bill” of the operations.⁷⁷ Europe, therefore, feels today more than ever the urgent need for better and stronger military capabilities that could enable the EU to act autonomously in crises taking place in Europe.

NATO from the beginning viewed the common European security identity/policy (i) as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance, (ii) as a part of NATO's own transformation process, and (iii) as one that should be created *within* the framework of the Atlantic Alliance. Although the United States, while expressing full-hearted support for it on the surface, always looked at the European integration with some skepticism and worries, especially when it

came to defense matters. Still, as long as the European allies envisioned their security and defense identity (ESDI) *within* the framework of NATO, and European defense was planned to be *separable but not separate*, there was diplomatic reassurance from the side of NATO officials and the American diplomacy for European policies. However, the St. Malo concept of an independent European Security and Defense Policy with “the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces,” provoked much opposition from the United States.⁷⁸

What were the main concerns with independent European defense capabilities that had brought about skepticism earlier and created a serious debate after St. Malo? The reasons for skepticism and later opposition were soon formulated to be the “*three D's*,” i.e. duplication, decoupling, and discrimination.

The fear from *duplication*, as expressed by U.S. Senator Roth or Secretary of State Albright, means that if Europe created its own defense capabilities and decision-making mechanisms, it would duplicate the assets that NATO, and mainly the U.S., had established during the 50 years of the Alliance. There are differing views on this subject among analysts. Stanley Sloan, a well-known American expert on U.S.–European security relations, claims that the concept of ESDI adopted at the Berlin NATO Summit in June 1996, which set out that NATO would give the Europeans access to its defense capabilities in operations led by European structures, might have been a ‘better deal’ economically because of (anti)duplication costs: “The European decision to create ‘autonomous’ military capabilities suggests that their concept of avoiding ‘unnecessary duplication’ may cost them much more than would the assumptions built into the Berlin agreement.”⁷⁹ Other analysts are of different opinion. François Heisbourg, Chairperson of the Geneva Center for Security Policy, claims that duplication is an ungrounded American concern since “some duplication is necessary,” and, moreover, “the problems of duplication are... worse among the Europeans than between the Europeans and

the Americans."⁸⁰ Furthermore, he believes that duplication could even be useful in fields where all NATO members run short, and European gains in those areas could benefit NATO as an Alliance, too.⁸¹

The second D of the American/NATO concerns about ESDP is that of *decoupling*. This expression is not a new term in security policy as it had been referred to different security phenomena in different situations. Its basic implication has always been that some diplomatic or military measure taken could artificially divide the Atlantic Allies. In the case of ESDI/ESDP, Americans use the term 'decoupling' to designate the divisions and distinctions that the new European defense policy might cause. They argue that ESDP might often create situations which, being added together over time, could produce an 'us vs. them' contradiction.⁸² Again, experts differ on whether these concerns are realistic or not. Stanley Sloan claims that the differences in approach and interests between Americans and Europeans, which have always existed, were capable of being resolved within the NATO framework that provided mechanisms for working out compromises. According to Sloan, this would not be the case in the new situation created by St. Malo. "NATO's 'golden rule of consultation' does not eliminate... differences but provides a setting in which differing approaches can be compromised... The dynamics of the new arrangements may impose subtle barriers to communication and compromise that do not exist today."⁸³ Heisbourg, on the other hand, argues that the concern of decoupling is entirely unrealistic and part of the "damaging rhetoric" that should be 'thrown into the rubbish bin.' "The Europeans are just as intent as the Americans on avoiding decoupling – possibly more so."⁸⁴

Discrimination has been the third concern of Americans over ESDP. This means that the United States and other non-EU members of NATO are afraid that if the EU develops a more and more comprehensive and independent European defense and security policy, the NATO countries outside EU will be excluded from decision-

making. A part of this fear is that, over time, the main decisions on Europe's security will be made in the EU, and that, as a consequence, the role of the Atlantic Alliance and its policy-making mechanisms would be diminished. As Heisbourg claims, discrimination is a "double-edged issue:" both sides, non-NATO members of EU and non-EU members of NATO, equally have reasons to fear from being excluded from security decision-making.⁸⁵ Therefore, both groups of countries have to understand the position of the other and work out useful compromises. "The process of European integration is of a quasi-constitutional nature. It is fated to develop a security and defence dimension, and some discrimination between members and non-members is by definition inevitable."⁸⁶ Finding compromises on the involvement of all NATO members in EU decision-making, and *vice versa*, is thus also inevitable for the development of a workable European Security and Defense Policy and Identity.

Although analysts maintain different views on whether all of the three main concerns (*three D's*) are realistic bases for opposition to ESDP/ESDI from the American and Atlantic side, it is clear that the disagreements over these have to be resolved in order to secure the future of the Atlantic Alliance. As one attempt to ease the disputes mentioned above, the new Secretary General of NATO, George Robertson, offered the idea of the *three I's* in his speech at the 45th annual session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly: "For my part, I will ensure that ESDI is based on three key principles... improvement in European defense capabilities; inclusiveness and transparency for all Allies; and the indivisibility of transatlantic security, based on shared values."⁸⁷ Even though the three I's contain within themselves the problems included in the three D's, the positive attitude intrinsic in this approach could be the solution for the disagreements between the U.S.-led group of NATO countries and the group of EU countries.

In spite of the heated disagreements and the, seeming and real, contradictions, the new direction of ESDI/ESDP can be harmonized

with NATO objectives. First, as seen above, there is nothing in the latest policies of NATO or the EU in absolute opposition to one another. "There is no *prima facie* incompatibility between the political and strategic principles contained in the relevant NATO decisions and those laid out in the fundamental European documents."⁸⁸ Second, the evolving European defense identity and policy will obviously be closely attached to NATO policies and decision-making due to the fact that the majority of countries have dual membership. "The development of a common European defense and security policy is a process intimately tied to the Atlantic Alliance."⁸⁹ Third, it is obvious by now that NATO, with its fifty years of existence and functioning, is an endurable element of the European security architecture. "The transatlantic link established fifty years ago... continues to be a central element in Europe's vision of security... The concept of ESDI, aiming to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance, does in no way question this link. On the contrary, it seeks to reinforce the transatlantic cooperation, which is considered to be an indispensable element of a successful Alliance."⁹⁰

Conclusion: A New Alliance for the 21st Century

In 1989, no one expected that in twelve years the Euro-Atlantic security and political environment would become what it is today (Spring 2001). During the last decade, enormous changes took place in the world. Its members dissolved the Soviet Union to establish the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia fell apart while the two German states united. The members of the European Community formed the European Union (EU). The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was transformed into the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The Western European Union (WEU) completed its mission and disappeared from the international scene.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has changed during the last twelve years as well. First, NATO began opening up towards the East, towards the former Soviet Bloc with a series of initiatives.

As a result, NATO today has 3 new members from its former adversaries while it also conducts common activities on a regular basis with 25 other European countries outside the Alliance. Through enlargement and the establishment of new bodies of cooperation and partnership, NATO became a comprehensive forum for East-West security cooperation during the 1990s and therefore a stable stakeholder in global security.

Moreover, NATO took a large share of the task of developing a common European security and defense system, together with its partner institutions, the Western European Union and the European Union. While working and debating on ESDI, the Alliance itself became an integral part of the newly evolving European security and defense identity. Without the defense capabilities of NATO, any European initiative to act autonomously in certain security situations would have resulted in complete fiasco. Since the building up of independent European capabilities will take a long time, Allied capacities and resources will be necessary in the future as well. NATO has therefore proven itself to be a necessary and irreplaceable element of the new European security architecture.

Still, further challenges await the Atlantic Alliance. Developing the ESDI will require a lot of patience and understanding from North American and European NATO representatives and leaders. As Kissinger claims, "The task before the Alliance is to adapt the two basic institutions which shape the Atlantic relationship, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union... to the realities of the post-Cold War world."⁹¹ The solution of the continuing crisis around ethnic Albanians in Macedonia and Kosovo might demand the active participation of NATO in crisis management and potentially in peacekeeping operations. The partnership with Russia further needs to be reassured internationally and its internal obstacles need to be removed. As Kaiser concludes, "To enhance stability in the East, NATO members must work for the spread of democracy."⁹² Within the organization, a more balanced way of defense bur-

den-sharing has to be designed in order to provide for a fair way of participation in financing as well as in decision-making. Last but not least, the Alliance should prepare itself for the next phases of enlargement.

Although many international and regional organizations disappeared in the last decade and earlier, Transatlantic security cooperation has remained an enduring element of the international order. Provided that the Alliance and its members take the necessary measures to adequately meet the challenges ahead, the relevance and power of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will continue to be unquestionable in the 21st century.

Appendix 1: List of Abbreviations

CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
CFE Treaty Treaty on the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
CJTF Combined Joint Task Force(s)
CoE Council of Europe
CSCE Council on Security and Cooperation in Europe
DCI Defense Capabilities Initiative
EAPC Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EC European Communities
EDC European Defense Community
EEC European Economic Community
EPC European Political Cooperation
ESDI European Security and Defense Identity
ESDP European Security and Defense Policy
FAWEU Forces Answerable to the Western European Union
FYROM the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
NAC North Atlantic Council
NACC North Atlantic Cooperation Council
OEEC Organization for European Economic Cooperation
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

PfP or PFP Partnership for Peace
WEU Western European Union

Appendix 2: Secretary Generals of NATO in the Post-Cold War Era

1988 – 1994 Manfred Wörner
 1994 – 1995 Willy Claes
 1995 Sergio Balanzino (Acting Secr. Gen.)
 1995 – 1999 Javier Solana
 1999 – George Robertson

Notes

¹ "1990s: The Emerging CFSP and ESDI"

² *ibid.*

³ *ibid.*

⁴ Baker 40

⁵ "NATO at a Glance" 69

⁶ *ibid.*

⁷ *ibid.*

⁸ Gazdag, "Nyugat-európai Unió" 302

⁹ "NATO at..." 69

¹⁰ Gazdag, "Nyugat-európai Unió" 302

¹¹ *ibid.*

¹² "NATO at..." 69-70

¹³ Gazdag, "Nyugat-európai Unió" 302

¹⁴ "NATO at..." 70

¹⁵ *ibid.*

¹⁶ *ibid.*

¹⁷ *ibid.*

¹⁸ "NATO Handbook" v056

¹⁹ "NATO at..." 73

²⁰ *ibid.*

²¹ "NATO Handbook" v056

²² "NATO at..." 74

²³ See the details of the concept in the section on CJTF.

²⁴ Hargita 379

²⁵ "1998-1999: A New..."

²⁶ Of course, the West still had to take into account the possibility of a Communist coup in the Kremlin or in Central and Eastern Europe.

²⁷ Martinusz II

²⁸ *ibid.*

²⁹ *ibid.*

- ³⁰ Martinusz 12
³¹ Kereszty 14
³² Kereszty 18
³³ Martinusz 13
³⁴ Martinusz 17
³⁵ Martinusz 13
³⁶ Martinusz 17
³⁷ Molnár 95
³⁸ Gazdag, "Nyugat-európai Unió" 302
³⁹ *ibid.*
⁴⁰ "NATO at..." 70
⁴¹ *ibid.*
⁴² Molnár 95
⁴³ "NATO at..." 27-28; "NATO Handbook" v052
⁴⁴ "NATO at..." 68
⁴⁵ Schmidt 13
⁴⁶ "NATO at..." 70-71
⁴⁷ *ibid.*
⁴⁸ "NATO at..." 31-32; "NATO Handbook" v052
⁴⁹ "NATO at..." 70
⁵⁰ *ibid.*
⁵¹ *ibid.*
⁵² Gazdag, "Nyugat-európai Unió" 303
⁵³ Molnár 95
⁵⁴ Schmidt 12
⁵⁵ Hargita 379
⁵⁶ *ibid.*
⁵⁷ 1998-1999: A New European Impetus
⁵⁸ Schmidt 12
⁵⁹ Heisbourg 8
⁶⁰ Baker 40
⁶¹ Baker 40, 42
⁶² "NATO Handbook" V056
⁶³ Maastricht Treaty quoted in "NATO Handbook" v056
⁶⁴ *ibid.*
⁶⁵ *ibid.*
⁶⁶ St. Malo Declaration quoted in "1998-1999: A New European Impetus"
⁶⁷ Sloan 54
⁶⁸ Sloan 55
⁶⁹ "The Alliance's Strategic Concept" [1999] D9
⁷⁰ "Washington Summit Communiqué" D4
⁷¹ "1998-1999: A New..."

- ⁷² *ibid.*
⁷³ Sloan 56
⁷⁴ Heisbourg 8; Kissinger 515
⁷⁵ Belenet 38; Sloan 51-53
⁷⁶ Belenet 37; Sloan 55
⁷⁷ Magyarics 162
⁷⁸ "1998-1999: A New...;" Sloan 49-57
⁷⁹ Sloan 62-63
⁸⁰ Heisbourg 10
⁸¹ *ibid.*
⁸² Sloan 63
⁸³ *ibid.*
⁸⁴ Heisbourg 10
⁸⁵ *ibid.*
⁸⁶ *ibid.*
⁸⁷ Sloan 56
⁸⁸ Heisbourg 11
⁸⁹ Heisbourg 10
⁹⁰ Molnár 94-95
⁹¹ Kissinger 820
⁹² Kaiser 135

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