@workingpaper {602689,
	title = {Taking the Mayor{\textquoteright}s Measure: Personnel Changes Associated with Turnover in Chinese Municipal Leadership (2018)},
	year = {Working Paper},
	abstract = {Quantitative research on Chinese municipal governments tends to focus on the purportedly uniform, performance-based promotion incentives faced by top leaders{\textemdash}Party Secretaries and Mayors{\textemdash}effectively ignoring constraints from the complicated apparatus of municipal government and the possibility that they might exhibit personal policy preferences. This project takes a step backward to characterize the importance and nature of the top leadership in Chinese municipalities, with a particular focus on personnel management in municipal government agencies. Drawing on a dataset of party and government personnel from Fujian province, I show that, until about 2010, leaders of municipal bureaucracies were appointed and removed in a relatively stable pattern, and much of the time they were serving party secretaries or mayors who did not appoint them. Since 2010, however, personnel management has become less routinized, and as a result, agency leaders are increasingly serving under the top leadership who appointed them to their post.},
	author = {Saul Wilson}
}
