Soderborg S. Electoral Manipulation in Indonesia: From Structured, Systematic, and Massive to Sporadic, Isolated, and Minor. In: Tan N, Templeman K Electoral Manipulation in East and Southeast Asia. Lynne Riener ; Forthcoming. manipulation_d5.docx
Soderborg S. What Will Happen in Indonesia’s 2019 Legislative Election?. Cambridge: Harvard University; 2018. election_pred_apr18.pdf
Soderborg SN. Volunteer Spies, Volunteer Bureaucrats: Neighborhood Governance in Indonesia and Around the World, in Midwest Political Science Association 2015 Conference. Chicago, IL ; 2015.Abstract

In many developing countries, auxiliaries of the formal civil service are organized at the level of a handful of households to carry out administrative tasks. This institutional form is especially common in, but not limited to, Pacific Asia, where it is legacy of Japanese colonialism. Neighborhood governance of this kind is a top-down project designed to direct organizational life to state purposes. When effective, these systems provide cheap labor to the statesupplementing small civil services and security forces with organized volunteersThese systems originated in periods of non-democratic rule, but in a number of countries, have continued to function long after democratization. It is not clear, however, why residents choose to provide this labor in a democratic contextWith evidence from Indonesia, I find evidence suggesting that the effectiveness of the neighborhood governance system depends on residents’ incentives to participate, and that these are related to individual characteristics, including age, and community characteristics like residential mobility. I then outline designs for testinthe effects of these characteristics on participation in neighborhood governance, and the effects of neighborhood leadership density on political participation and disaster recovery. 

Soderborg SN. How Social Policy and Scandal Transformed Brazil's Partido dos Trabalhadores. University of Michigan. 2012. University of Michigan Deep Blue Archive CopyAbstract
This paper analyzes evidence that the PT’s electoral base has changed over time, posits that the Bolsa Família social welfare program and a 2005 corruption scandal worked together to produce the shift, if it happened, and uses municipal-level data to test a model of voter support for PT candidates in congressional races. It also considers whether the Bolsa program is subject to clientelistic interference. Results suggest that the Bolsa program does increase voter support for the PT at the municipal level, and that this effect has grown larger as the average benefit payment has increased. The provision of conditional benefits to Brazil’s poorest citizens has firmly entrenched a pro-poor discourse likely to remain the norm for the foreseeable future.