Newell, Richard G, and Robert N Stavins. “
Cost Heterogeneity and the Potential Savings from Market-Based Policies.”
Journal of Regulatory Economics 23 (2003): 43–59.
Publisher's VersionAbstractPolicy makers and analysts are often faced with situations where it is unclear whether market-based instruments hold real promise of reducing costs, relative to conventional uniform standards. We develop analytic expressions that can be employed with modest amounts of information to estimate the potential cost savings associated with market-based policies, with an application to the environmental policy realm. These simple formulae can identify instruments that merit more detailed investigation. We illustrate the use of these results with an application to nitrogen oxides control by electric utilities in the United States.
jregecon_cost_heterogeneity.pdf Stavins, Robert N, Alexander F Wagner, and Gernot Wagner. “
Interpreting Sustainability in Economic Terms: Dynamic Efficiency Plus Intergenerational Equity.”
Economics Letters 79 (2003): 339–343.
Publisher's VersionAbstractEconomists have confined the concept of ‘sustainability’ to intertemporal distributional equity. We propose a broader definition, combining dynamic efficiency and intergenerational equity, and relate it to two concepts from neoclassical economics: potential Pareto-improvements and inter-personal compensation.
sustainability_paper_in_econ_let.pdf Aldy, Joseph E, Scott Barrett, and Robert N Stavins. “
Thirteen Plus One: A Comparison of Global Climate Policy Architectures.”
Climate Policy 3 (2003): 373–397.
AbstractWe critically review the Kyoto Protocol and thirteen alternative policy architectures for addressing the threat of global climate change. We employ six criteria to evaluate the policy proposals: environmental outcome, dynamic efficiency, cost-effectiveness, equity, flexibility in the presence of new information, and incentives for participation and compliance. The Kyoto Protocol does not fare well on a number of criteria, but none of the alternative proposals fare well along all six dimensions. We identify several major themes among the alternative proposals: Kyoto is “too little, too fast”; developing countries (DCs) should play a more substantial role and receive incentives to participate; implementation should focus on market-based approaches, especially those with price mechanisms; and participation and compliance incentives are inadequately addressed by most proposals. Our investigation reveals tensions among several of the evaluative criteria, such as between environmental outcome and efficiency, and between cost-effectiveness and incentives for participation and compliance.
thirteen_plus_one_article.pdf