Stavins, Robert N. “Book Review: Jancis Robinson, Tasting Pleasures – Confessions of a Wine Lover.” Journal of Wine Economics 2 (2007): 106–108. Publisher's Version tasting_pleasure_by_jancis_robinson_review_by_stavins_proof.pdf


Stavins, Robert N. “Comments on the Recommendations of the Market Advisory Committee to the California Air Resources Board, 'Recommendations for Designing a Greenhouse Gas Cap-and-Trade System for California.” Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2007. stavins_comments_on_draft_mac_report.pdf


Stavins, Robert N, and RL Revesz. “Environmental Law.” In Handbook of Law and Economics, edited by Mitchell A Polinsky and Steven Shavell, 1:499–589. Amsterdam, Netherlands: Elsevier Science, 2007.Abstract

Law can be viewed as a body of rules and legal sanctions that channel behavior in socially desirable directions for example, by encouraging individuals to take proper...



Stavins, Robert N. “Free GHG Cuts: Too Good to Be True? (greenhouse Gases).” The Environmental Forum 24 (2007): 16. column_18.pdf


Jaffe, Judson, and Robert N Stavins. “Linking Tradable Permit Systems for Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Opportunities, Implications, and Challenges.” Geneva, Switzerland: International Emissions Trading Association, 2007. ieta_linking_report.pdf


Stavins, Robert N. “Managing Water Demand – Price vs. Non-Price Conservation Programs.” Boston, Massachusetts: Pioneer Institute for Public Policy Research, 2007. pioneer_olmstead_stavins_water.pdf


Stavins, Robert N. “Market-Based Environmental Policies: What Can We Learn From U.S. Experience (and Related Research)?” In Moving to Markets in Environmental Regulation: Lessons from Twenty Years of Experience, edited by Jody Freeman and Charles D Kolstad, 19–47. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.Abstract

Over the last decade, market-based incentives have become the regulatory tool of choice when trying to solve difficult environmental problems. Evidence of their dominance can be seen in recent proposals for addressing global warming (through an emissions trading scheme in the Kyoto Protocol) and for amending the Clean Air Act (to add a new emissions trading systems for smog precursors and mercury–the Bush administration's "Clear Skies" program). They are widely viewed as more efficient than traditional command and control regulation. This collection of essays takes a critical look at this question, and evaluates whether the promises of market-based regulation have been fulfilled.



Olmstead, Sheila M, and Robert N Stavins. “A Meaningful Second Commitment Period for the Kyoto Protocol.” The Economist's Voice (2007): 1–6. olmstead_stavins_for_economist_voice1.pdf


Stavins, Robert N. “Misconceptions About H2O Pricing.” The Environmental Forum 24 (2007): 18. column_20.pdf


Stavins, Robert N. “Policies Can Work in Strange Ways.” The Environmental Forum 24 (2007): 16. column_16.pdf


Bennear, Lori Snyder, and Robert N Stavins. “Second-Best Theory and the Use of Multiple Policy Instruments.” Environmental and Resource Economics 37 (2007): 111–129. bennear_stavins_for_ere_revisied.pdf


Stavins, Robert N. “A Sensible Way to Cut CO2 Emissions.” The Environmental Forum 24 (2007): 18. column_21.pdf


Stavins, Robert, Judson Jaffe, and Todd Schatzki. “Too good to be true? An examination of three economic assessments of California climate change policy.” National Bureau of Economic Research, 2007. Publisher's Version too_good_to_be_true.pdf


Stavins, Robert N. “Tradable Permits: Fly in the Ointment?The Environmental Forum 24 (2007): 16. column_17.pdf


Stavins, Robert N. “A U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to Address Global Climate Change.” Washington, D.C. The Hamilton Project, 2007. stavins_hp_discussion_paper_2007-13.pdf


Jaffe, Judson, and Robert N Stavins. “On the Value of Formal Assessment of Uncertainty in Regulatory Analysis.” Regulation & Governance 1 (2007): 154–171.Abstract

The US Office of Management and Budget introduced in 2003 a new requirement for the treatment of uncertainty in Regulatory Impact Analyses (RIAs) of proposed regulations, requiring agencies to carry out a formal quantitative uncertainty assessment regarding a regulation’s benefits and costs if either is expected to reach \$1 billion annually. Despite previous use in other contexts, such formal assessments of uncertainty have rarely been employed in RIAs or other regulatory analyses. We describe how formal quantitative assessments of uncertainty – in particular, Monte Carlo analyses – can be conducted, we examine the challenges and limitations of such analyses in the context of RIAs, and we assess how the resulting information can affect the evaluation of regulations. For illustrative purposes, we compare Monte Carlo analysis with methods typically used in RIAs to evaluate uncertainty in the context of economic analyses carried out for the US Environmental Protection Agency’s Nonroad Diesel Rule, which became effective in 2004. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] Copyright of Regulation & Governance is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)



Olmstead, Sheila M, W Michael Hanemann, and Robert N Stavins. “Water Demand Under Alternative Price Structures.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 54 (2007): 181–198. Publisher's VersionAbstract

We estimate the price elasticity of water demand with household-level data, structurally modeling the piecewise-linear budget constraints imposed by increasing block pricing. We develop a mathematical expression for the unconditional price elasticity of demand under increasing block prices and compare conditional and unconditional elasticities analytically and empirically. We test the hypothesis that price elasticity may depend on price structure, beyond technical differences in elasticity concepts. Due to the possibility of endogenous utility price structure choice, observed differences in elasticity across price structures may be due either to a behavioral response to price structure, or to underlying heterogeneity among water utility service areas.



Stavins, Robert N. “What Is the Future of U.S. Coal?The Environmental Forum 24 (2007): 16. column_19.pdf


Anderson, Kym, V Ashenfelter, Victor Ginsburgh, and Robert N Stavins. “Editorial Welcome.” Journal of Wine Economics 1 (2006). Publisher's Version
Stavins, Robert N. “As Reservoirs Fall, Prices Should Rise.” The Environmental Forum 23 (2006): 14. column_15.pdf