Stavins, Robert N. “The Utility Safety Valve for Cutting CO2.” The Environmental Forum 23 (2006): 14. column_12.pdf


Stavins, Robert N. “Vintage-Differentiated Environmental Regulation.” Stanford Environmental Law Journal 25 (2006): 29–63. Publisher's Version vintage_differentiated_regulation_by_stavins.pdf


Stavins, Robert N. “What Role for U.S. CO2 Sequestration?The Environmental Forum 23 (2006): 16. column_14.pdf


Stavins, Robert N. “A Better Climate Change Agreement.” The Environmental Forum 22 (2005): 12. column_5.pdf


Stavins, Robert N. “Beyond Kyoto: Getting Serious About Climate Change.” The Milken Institute Review 7 (2005): 28–37. milken_institute_review_article_on_climate_policy.pdf


Richards, Kenneth R, and Robert N Stavins. “The Cost of U.S. Forest-Based Carbon Sequestration.” Arlington, Virginia: Pew Center on Global Climate Change, 2005. richards_stavins_final_pew_report.pdf


Stavins, Robert N. “Does Econ Analysis Shortchange Future.” The Environmental Forum 22 (2005): 14. column_10.pdf


Stavins, Robert N. “Don't Blame Romney: Support the Safety-Valve for the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative.” The Boston Globe (2005). op-ed_boston_globe_dec12_2005.pdf


Stavins, Robert N. “The Effects of Vintage-Differentiated Environmental Regulation.” Washington, D.C. AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, 2005. vintage_differentiated_regulation.pdf


Environmental Protection and the Social Responsibility of Firms: Perspectives from Law, Economics, and Business
Hay, Bruce L, Robert N Stavins, and Richard HK Vietor. Environmental Protection and the Social Responsibility of Firms: Perspectives from Law, Economics, and Business. Washington, D.C. Resources for the Future, 2005.Abstract

Everyone agrees that firms should obey the law. But beyond what the law requires-beyond bare compliance with regulations-do firms have additional social responsibilities to commit resources voluntarily to environmental protection? How should we think about firms sacrificing profits in the social interest? Are they permitted to do so, given their fiduciary responsibilities to their shareholders? Even if permissible, is the practice sustainable, or will the competitive marketplace render such efforts and their impacts transient at best? Furthermore, is the practice, however well intended, an efficient use of social and economic resources? And, as an empirical matter, to what extent do firms already behave this way? Until now, public discussion has generated more heat than light on both the normative and positive questions surrounding corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the environmental realm. In Environmental Protection and the Social Responsibility of Firms, some of the nation s leading scholars in law, economics, and business examine commonly accepted assumptions at the heart of current debates on corporate social responsibility and provide a foundation for future research and policymaking.


Stavins, Robert N. “Global Warming.” Letters & Notes 1 (2005). american_interest.pdf


Stavins, Robert N. “Implications of the U.S. Experience with Market-Based Environment Strategies for Future Climate Policy.” In Emissions Trading for Climate Policy: US and European Perspectives, edited by Bernd Hansjürgens, 63–77. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.Abstract

Review: "The 1997 Kyoto Conference introduced emissions trading as a new policy instrument for climate protection. Bringing together scholars in the fields of economics, political science, and law, this book provides a description, analysis, and evaluation of different aspects of emissions trading as an instrument to control greenhouse gases. The authors analyse theoretical aspects of regulatory instruments for climate policy, provide an overview of US experience with market-based instruments, draw lessons from existing trading schemes for the control of greenhouse gases, and discuss options for emissions trading in climate policy. They also highlight the background of climate policy and instrument choice in the USA and Europe, and of the emerging new systems in Europe, particularly the new EU directive for a CO[subscript 2] emissions trading system."–Jacket.



Stavins, Robert N. “Lessons Learned from SO2 Allowance Trading.” Choices 20 (2005): 53–57. Publisher's Version choices.pdf


Stavins, Robert N. “The Making of a Conventional Wisdom.” The Environmental Forum 22 (2005): 10. column_8.pdf


Stavins, Robert N. “Markets Can Make Fisheries Sustainable.” The Environmental Forum 22 (2005): 12. column_6.pdf


Stavins, Robert N. “Regulating by Vintage: Let's Put a Cork in It.(grandfather Clause on Power Plant Regulation).” The Environmental Forum 22 (2005): 10. column_7.pdf


Jaffe, Adam B, Richard G Newell, and Robert N Stavins. “A Tale of Two Market Failures: Technology and Environmental Policy.” Technological Change and the Environment Technological Change 54 (2005): 164–174. Publisher's VersionAbstract

Market failures associated with environmental pollution interact with market failures associated with the innovation and diffusion of new technologies. These combined market failures provide a strong rationale for a portfolio of public policies that foster emissions reduction as well as the development and adoption of environmentally beneficial technology. Both theory and empirical evidence suggest that the rate and direction of technological advance is influenced by market and regulatory incentives, and can be cost-effectively harnessed through the use of economic-incentive based policy. In the presence of weak or nonexistent environmental policies, investments in the development and diffusion of new environmentally beneficial technologies are very likely to be less than would be socially desirable. Positive knowledge and adoption spillovers and information problems can further weaken innovation incentives. While environmental technology policy is fraught with difficulties, a long-term view suggests a strategy of experimenting with policy approaches and systematically evaluating their success.



Bennear, Lori S, Robert N Stavins, and Alexander F Wagner. “Using Revealed Preferences to Infer Environmental Benefits:Evidence from Recreational Fishing Licenses.” Journal of Regulatory Economics 28 (2005): 157–179. Publisher's VersionAbstract

We develop and apply a new method for estimating the economic benefits of an environmental amenity. The method is based upon the notion of estimating the derived demand for a privately traded option to utilize an open access good. In particular, the demand for state fishing licenses is used to infer the benefits of recreational fishing. Using panel data on state fishing license sales and prices for the continental United States over a 15-year period, combined with data on substitute prices and demographic variables, a license demand function is estimated with instrumental variable procedures to allow for the potential endogeneity of administered prices. The econometric results lead to estimates of the benefits of a fishing license, and subsequently to the expected benefits of a recreational fishing day. In contrast with previous studies, which have utilized travel cost or hypothetical market methods, our approach provides estimates that are directly comparable across geographic areas. Our findings show substantial variation in the value of a recreational fishing day across geographic areas in the United States. This suggests that current practice of using benefits estimates from one part of the country in national or regional analyses may lead to substantial bias in benefits estimates.



Stavins, Robert N. “What Baseball Can Teach Policymakers.” The Environmental Forum 22 (2005): 14. column_9.pdf


Jaffe, Adam B, Richard G Newell, and Robert N Stavins. “Economics of Energy Efficiency.” In Encyclopedia of Energy, edited by Cutler J Cleveland, 2:79–90. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2004. encyclopedia_of_energy_2004.pdf