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Stavins, Robert. “Can Countries Cut Carbon Emissions Without Hurting Economic Growth? Yes, the Transition Can be Gradual – and Affordable.” The Wall Street Journal (2009). Publisher's Version
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Stavins, Robert N. “Can We Afford to Cut Carbon?” The Environmental Forum 27 (2010): 16.

column_34.pdf

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Stavins, Robert N. “Cancun Produces Meaningful Steps.” The Environmental Forum 28 (2011): 16.

column_41.pdf

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Stavins, Robert N. “Cap and Trade Is the Only Feasible Way of Cutting Emissions.” The New York Times (2014). Publisher's VersionAbstract
With 30 years of success, even if uneven at times, pricing regimes have provided incentives to achieve goals in the least expensive manner. By Robert N. Stavins.
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Stavins, Robert N. “Cap-and-Trade or a Carbon Tax? (methods for Controlling Greenhouse Gases).” The Environmental Forum 25 (2008): 16.

column_22.pdf

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Goulder, Lawrence H, and Robert N Stavins. “Challenges from State-Federal Interactions in Us Climate Change Policy.” American Economic Review 101 (2011): 253–257. Publisher's Version

goulderstavinsaerpapersproceedings.pdf

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Stavins, Robert N. “Chinese and US Climate Interests Are Converging.” China Dialogue, 2014. Publisher's VersionAbstract

Bilateral climate change negotiations between China and the US are the most significant development since the Kyoto Protocol

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Stavins, Robert N. “Clean Profits: Using Economic Incentives to Protect the Environment.” Policy Review 48 (1989): 58–63.

clean_profits.pdf

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Newell, Richard G, and Robert N Stavins. “Climate Change and Forest Sinks: Factors Affecting the Costs of Carbon Sequestration.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 40 (2000): 211–235. Publisher's VersionAbstract

newell_stavins_jeem.pdf

The possibility of encouraging the growth of forests as a means of sequestering carbon dioxide has received considerable attention, partly because of evidence that this can be a relatively inexpensive means of combating climate change. But how sensitive are such estimates to specific conditions? We examine the sensitivity of carbon sequestration costs to changes in critical factors, including the nature of management and deforestation regimes, silvicultural species, relative prices, and discount rates.

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Aldy, Joseph E, and Robert N Stavins. “Climate Negotiations Open a Window: Key Implications of the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action.” Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA: Harvard Project on Climate Agreements, 2012. Publisher's VersionAbstract

aldy_stavins_durban-brief_hpca.pdf

A key outcome of the Seventeenth Conference of the Parties (COP-17) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), held in Durban, South Africa, late in 2011 — the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action — represents an important milestone in the history of climate negotiations. This is because it departs from the long-standing and problematic dichotomous division of the world's countries into those with serious emissions-reduction responsibilities and the others — with no such responsibilities whatsoever. That distinction, now apparently abandoned, has prevented meaningful progress for decades. The Durban Platform — by replacing the Berlin Mandate's (1995) division of the world into a set of countries with ambitious responsibilities and another set of countries with no responsibilities — has opened an important window. National delegations from around the world now have a challenging task before them: to identify a new international climate policy architecture that is consistent with the process, pathway, and principles laid out in the Durban Platform, while still being consistent with the UNFCCC. The challenge is to find a way to include all key countries in a structure that brings about meaningful emission reduction on an appropriate timetable at acceptable cost, while recognizing the different circumstances of countries in a way that is more subtle, more sophisticated, and — most important — more effective than the dichotomous distinction of years past.

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