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    Olmstead, Sheila M, and Robert N Stavins. “Three Key Elements of a Post-2012 International Climate Policy Architecture.” Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 6 (2012): 65 –85. Publisher's VersionAbstract
    olmstead_stavins_in_reep_symposium_published.pdf

    This article describes three essential elements of an effective post-2012 international climate policy architecture: a framework to ensure that key industrialized and developing nations are involved in differentiated but meaningful ways, an emphasis on an extended time path for emissions targets, and the inclusion of flexible market-based policy instruments to keep costs down and facilitate international equity. This overall architecture is consistent with fundamental aspects of the science, economics, and politics of global climate change; addresses specific shortcomings of the Kyoto Protocol; and builds on the foundation of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.

    A-68

    Aldy, Joseph E, Scott Barrett, and Robert N Stavins. “Thirteen Plus One: A Comparison of Global Climate Policy Architectures.” Climate Policy 3 (2003): 373–397.Abstract
    thirteen_plus_one_article.pdf

    We critically review the Kyoto Protocol and thirteen alternative policy architectures for addressing the threat of global climate change. We employ six criteria to evaluate the policy proposals: environmental outcome, dynamic efficiency, cost-effectiveness, equity, flexibility in the presence of new information, and incentives for participation and compliance. The Kyoto Protocol does not fare well on a number of criteria, but none of the alternative proposals fare well along all six dimensions. We identify several major themes among the alternative proposals: Kyoto is “too little, too fast”; developing countries (DCs) should play a more substantial role and receive incentives to participate; implementation should focus on market-based approaches, especially those with price mechanisms; and participation and compliance incentives are inadequately addressed by most proposals. Our investigation reveals tensions among several of the evaluative criteria, such as between environmental outcome and efficiency, and between cost-effectiveness and incentives for participation and compliance.

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    Chan, Gabriel, Robert Stavins, Robert Stowe, and Richard Sweeney. “The SO2 Allowance-Trading System and the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990: Reflections on 20 Years of Policy Innovation.” National Tax Journal 65 (2012): 419–52. Publisher's VersionAbstract
    chan_et_al_so2_article_national_tax_journal_2012.pdf

    The introduction of the U.S. SO2 allowance-trading program to address the threat of acid rain as part of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 is a landmark event in the history of environmental regulation. The program was a great success by almost all measures. This paper, which draws upon a research workshop and a policy roundtable held at Harvard in May 2011, investigates critically the design, enactment, implementation, performance, and implications of this path-breaking application of economic thinking to environmental regulation. Ironically, cap-and-trade seems especially well suited to addressing the problem of climate change, in that emitted greenhouse gases are evenly distributed throughout the world’s atmosphere. Recent hostility toward cap-and-trade in debates about U.S. climate legislation may reflect the broader political environment of the climate debate more than the substantive merits of market-based regulation.

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    Aldy, Joseph E, and Robert N Stavins. “The Promise and Problems of Pricing Carbon Theory and Experience.” The Journal of Environment & Development 21 (2012): 152–180. Publisher's VersionAbstract
    aldy_stavins_pricing_carbon_in_jed.pdf

    Because of the global commons nature of climate change, international cooperation among nations will likely be necessary for meaningful action at the global level. At the same time, it will inevitably be up to the actions of sovereign nations to put in place policies that bring about meaningful reductions in the emissions of greenhouse gases. Due to the ubiquity and diversity of emissions of greenhouse gases in most economies, as well as the variation in abatement costs among individual sources, conventional environmental policy approaches, such as uniform technology and performance standards, are unlikely to be sufficient to the task. Therefore, attention has increasingly turned to market-based instruments in the form of carbon-pricing mechanisms. We examine the opportunities and challenges associated with the major options for carbon pricing—carbon taxes, cap-and-trade, emission reduction credits, clean energy standards, and fossil fuel subsidy reductions—and provide a review of the experiences, drawn primarily from developed countries, in implementing these instruments. Our summary of relevant theory and survey of experience from industrialized nations may be helpful to those who wish to examine the potential applicability of carbon pricing in the context of developing countries.

    A-71

    Carraro, Carlo, Ottmar Edenhofer, Christian Flachsland, Charles Kolstad, Robert N. Stavins, and Robert Stowe. “The IPCC at a Crossroads: Opportunities for Reform.” Science 350 (2015): 34–35. Publisher's VersionAbstract
    stavins_et_al_ipcc_science_151002.pdf

    The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has proven its value as an institution for large-scale scientific collaboration to synthesize and assess large volumes of climate research for use by policy-makers, as well as for establishing credibility of findings among diverse national governments. But the IPCC has received considerable criticism of both its substance and process. The new IPCC leadership to be elected in October could help guide the IPCC to a clear, shared understanding of future objectives and could shape procedural reforms. We identify key opportunities for reform by addressing two related questions: Is the IPCC doing the right things? Is the IPCC doing things right?

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    Newell, Richard G, Adam B Jaffe, and Robert N Stavins. “The Induced Innovation Hypothesis and Energy-Saving Technological Change.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 (1999): 941 –975. Publisher's VersionAbstract
    rff-dp-98-12-rev.pdf

    We develop a methodology for testing Hicks's induced innovation hypothesis by estimating a product-characteristics model of energy-using consumer durables, augmenting the hypothesis to allow for the influence of government regulations. For the products we explored, the evidence suggests that (i) the rate of overall innovation was independent of energy prices and regulations; (ii) the direction of innovation was responsive to energy price changes for some products but not for others; (iii) energy price changes induced changes in the subset of technically feasible models that were offered for sale; (iv) this responsiveness increased substantially during the period after energy-efficiency product labeling was required; and (v) nonetheless, a sizable portion of efficiency improvements were autonomous.

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    Jaffe, Adam B, and Robert N Stavins. “The Energy-Efficiency Gap: What Does It Mean?” Energy Policy 22 (1994): 804–810. Publisher's VersionAbstract
    the_energy_efficiency_gap.pdf

    As renewed attention has been given by policy makers to energy conservation issues, it has frequently been asserted that an energy-efficiency gap exists between actual and optimal energy use. The critical questions is how to define the optimal level of energy efficiency. This paper seeks to disentangle some confusing strands of argument that are frequently brought to bear on this question, by identifying the major conceptual issues that determine the set of feasible answers. We identify five separate and distinct notions of optimality: the economists' economic potential, the technologists' economic potential, hypothetical potential, the narrow social optimum and the true social optimum. Each of these has associated with it a corresponding definition of the energy-efficiency gap. Our analysis demonstrates that necessary preconditions for identifying the right measure of the energy-efficiency gap include understanding and disentangling market failure and non-market failure explanations for the gradual diffusion of energy-efficient technologies.

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