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    Jaffe, Adam B, and Robert N Stavins. “The Energy Paradox and the Diffusion of Conservation Technology.” Resource and Energy Economics 16 (1994): 91–122. Publisher's VersionAbstract
    theenergyparadox.ree1994.pdf

    We develop a framework for thinking about the 'paradox' of very gradual diffusion of apparently cost-effective energy-conservation technologies. Our analysis provides some keys to understanding why this technology-diffusion process i.s gradual, and focuses attention on the factors that cause this to be the case, including those associated with potential market failures - information problems, principal/agent slippage, and unobserved costs - and those explanations that do not represent market failures - private information costs, high discount rates, and heterogeneity among potential adopters. Additionally, our analysis indicates how alternative policy instruments - both economic incentives and direct regulations can hasten the diffusion of energy-conserving technologies.

    A-13

    Plantinga, Andrew J, Ruben N Lubowski, and Robert N Stavins. “The Effects of Potential Land Development on Agricultural Land Prices.” Journal of Urban Economics 52 (2002): 561–581. Publisher's VersionAbstract
    journal_of_urban_economics_2002.pdf

    We conduct a national-scale analysis of the determinants of agricultural land values. The theoretical basis for the study is a spatial city model with stochastic returns to future land development. The empirical model of agricultural land prices is estimated with a cross-section on approximately three thousand counties in the contiguous US. The results provide evidence that option values associated with irreversible and uncertain land development are capitalized into current farmland values. For each county, we decompose the current agricultural land value into components measuring rents from agricultural production and rents from future land development.

    A-33

    Hahn, Robert W, and Robert N Stavins. “The Effect of Allowance Allocations on Cap-and-Trade System Performance.” Journal of Law and Economics 54 (2011): S267–S294. Publisher's VersionAbstract
    hahn_stavins_in_journal_of_law_economics.pdf

    Abstract An implication of the Coase theorem is that under certain conditions, the market equilibrium in a cap-and-trade system will be cost-effective and independent of the initial allocation of tradable rights. That is, the overall cost of achieving a given aggregate emission reduction will be minimized, and the final allocation of permits will be independent of the initial allocation. We call this the independence property. This property is important because it means that the government can establish the overall pollution reduction goal for a cap-and-trade system by setting the cap and leaving it up to the legislature to construct a constituency in support of the program by allocating the allowances to various interests without affecting either the environmental performance of the system or its aggregate social costs. We examine the conditions under which the independence property is likely to hold—both in theory and in practice.

    A-73

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