Search

Search results

    Ranson, Matthew, and Robert N Stavins. “Post-Durban Climate Policy Architecture Based on Linkage of Cap-and-Trade Systems.” Chicago Journal of International Law 13 (2013): 403–438. Publisher's VersionAbstract

    The outcome of the December 2011 United Nations climate negotiations in Durban, South Africa, provides an important new opportunity to move toward an international climate policy architecture that is capable of delivering broad international participation and significant global CO2 emissions reductions at reasonable cost. We evaluate one important component of potential climate polig architecture for the post-Durban era: links among independent tradable permit systems for greenhouse gases, because linkage reduces the cost of achieving given targets, there is tremendous pressure to link existing and planned cap-and-trade systems, and in fact, a number of links already or will soon exist. We draw on recent political and economic experience with linkage to evaluate potential roles that linkage may play in post-Durban international climate policy, both in a near-term, de facto architecture of indirect links between regional, national, and sub-national cap-and-trade systems, and in a longer-term, more comprehensive bottom-up architecture of direct links. Although linkage will certainly help to reduce long-term abatement costs, it may also serve as an effective mechanism for building institutional and political structure to support a future climate agreement. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]

    A-76

    Portney, Paul R, and Robert N Stavins. “Regulatory Review of Environmental Policy: The Potential Role of Health-Health Analysis.” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty (1994): 111–122. Publisher's VersionAbstract

    Health-health analysis (HHA) posits a seemingly unassailable criterion for regulatory assessment: policies intended to protect human health ought to exhibit positive health benefits. Despite the apparent logic of this criterion, it is important to ask whether it would aid in the quest for better public policies. In the context of environmental issues, we find that HHA can be useful by reminding us that it is the net health impact of a proposed regulation that can be important. However, we also find that in most applications the health impacts of regulatory compliance costs are unlikely to be significant. Conventional benefit-cost analysis ought to remain the principal tool of economic assessment of environmental laws and regulations.

    A-11

    Hahn, Robert W, and Robert N Stavins. “The Effect of Allowance Allocations on Cap-and-Trade System Performance.” Journal of Law and Economics 54 (2011): S267–S294. Publisher's VersionAbstract

    Abstract An implication of the Coase theorem is that under certain conditions, the market equilibrium in a cap-and-trade system will be cost-effective and independent of the initial allocation of tradable rights. That is, the overall cost of achieving a given aggregate emission reduction will be minimized, and the final allocation of permits will be independent of the initial allocation. We call this the independence property. This property is important because it means that the government can establish the overall pollution reduction goal for a cap-and-trade system by setting the cap and leaving it up to the legislature to construct a constituency in support of the program by allocating the allowances to various interests without affecting either the environmental performance of the system or its aggregate social costs. We examine the conditions under which the independence property is likely to hold—both in theory and in practice.

    A-73

Pages