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    Stavins, Robert N, and Bradley W Whitehead. “Dealing with Pollution: Market-Based Incentives for Environmental Protection.” Environment 34 (1992): 7–11, 29–42. Publisher's VersionAbstract
    dealing_with_pollution.pdf

    A quest for innovative environmental policy instruments and a need for policies that harness rather than obstruct market forces has led to "pollution reduction credits" outlined in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. Incentives and management of various pollutants are discussed.

    A-7

    Newell, Richard G, and Robert N Stavins. “Cost Heterogeneity and the Potential Savings from Market-Based Policies.” Journal of Regulatory Economics 23 (2003): 43–59. Publisher's VersionAbstract
    jregecon_cost_heterogeneity.pdf

    Policy makers and analysts are often faced with situations where it is unclear whether market-based instruments hold real promise of reducing costs, relative to conventional uniform standards. We develop analytic expressions that can be employed with modest amounts of information to estimate the potential cost savings associated with market-based policies, with an application to the environmental policy realm. These simple formulae can identify instruments that merit more detailed investigation. We illustrate the use of these results with an application to nitrogen oxides control by electric utilities in the United States.

    A-34

    Stavins, Robert N. “Correlated Uncertainty and Policy Instrument Choice.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 30 (1996): 218–232. Publisher's VersionAbstract
    correlated_uncertainty_jeem.pdf

    For two decades, environmental economists have generally maintained that benefit uncertainty is irrelevant for choosing between price and quantity instruments, but that cost uncertainty matters, with the identity of the efficient instrument depending upon the relative slopes of the marginal benefit and cost functions. But, in the presence of simultaneous, correlated uncertainty, such policy instrument recommendations may be inappropriate. With plausible values of relevant parameters, the conventional identification of a price instrument will be reversed, to favor instead a quantity instrument. The opposite reversal—from the choice of a quantity instrument to a price instrument—seems less likely to occur.

    A-18

    Reinhardt, Forest L, and Robert N Stavins. “Corporate Social Responsibility, Business Strategy, and the Environment.” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 26 (2010): 164 –181. Publisher's VersionAbstract
    reinhardt_stavins_in_oxford_review_2010.pdf

    We examine the concept of firms sacrificing profits in the social interest within the environmental realm, with particular focus on the case of the United States by addressing four key questions. May they do so within the scope of their fiduciary responsibilities to their shareholders? Can they do so on a sustainable basis, or will the forces of a competitive marketplace render such efforts and their impacts transient at best? Do firms, in fact, frequently or at least sometimes behave this way, reducing their earnings by voluntarily engaging in environmental stewardship? Should firms carry out such profit-sacrificing activities (i.e. is this an efficient use of social resources)? We address these questions through the lens of economics, including insights from legal and business scholarship.

    A-62

    Reinhardt, Forest L, Robert N Stavins, and Richard HK Vietor. “Corporate Social Responsibility Through an Economic Lens.” Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 2 (2008): 219–239. Publisher's VersionAbstract
    reinhardt_stavins_vietor_reep.pdf

    Business leaders, government officials, and academics are focusing considerable attention on the concept of “corporate social responsibility” (CSR), particularly in the realm of environmental protection. Beyond complete compliance with environmental regulations, do firms have additional moral or social responsibilities to commit resources to environmental protection? How should we think about the notion of firms sacrificing profits in the social interest? May they do so within the scope of their fiduciary responsibilities to their shareholders? Can they do so on a sustainable basis, or will the forces of a competitive marketplace render such efforts and their impacts transient at best? Do firms, in fact, frequently or at least sometimes behave this way, reducing their earnings by voluntarily engaging in environmental stewardship? And finally, should firms carry out such profit-sacrificing activities (i.e., is this an efficient use of social resources)? We address these questions through the lens of economics, including insights from legal analysis and business scholarship.

    A-56

    Aldy, Joseph E, and Robert N Stavins. “Climate Negotiators Create an Opportunity for Scholars.” Science 337 (2012): 1043–1044. Publisher's VersionAbstract
    science-2012-aldy-1043-4.pdf

    The 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) launched a process to confront risks posed by global climate change. It has led to a dichotomy between countries with serious emission-reduction responsibilities and others with no responsibilities whatsoever. This has prevented progress, but recent talks suggest the prospect for a better way forward and an openness to outside-the-box thinking. Scholars and practitioners have a new opportunity to contribute innovative proposals for a future international climate policy architecture.

    A-75

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