Efficient Allocations under Ambiguity


Strzalecki, Tomasz, and Jan Werner. 2011. “Efficient Allocations under Ambiguity.” Journal of Economic Theory 146: 1173-1194.
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An important implication of the expected utility model under risk aversion is that if agents have the same probability belief, then the efficient allocations under uncertainty are comonotone with the aggregate endowment, and if their beliefs are concordant, then the efficient allocations are measurable with respect to the aggregate endowment. We study these two properties of efficient allocations for models of preferences that exhibit ambiguity aversion using the concept of conditional belief, which we introduce in this paper. We provide characterizations of such conditional beliefs for the standard models of preferences used in applications. ∗


Jan Werner: http://www.econ.umn.edu/~jwerner/


PDF: http://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/11352637
Last updated on 12/05/2013