Evidence about the relationship between exposure to media violence and criminal activity remains mixed. While some scholars argue that exposure to violent media contents "triggers" crime and aggression, others contend that media may influence crime, but only as a source of information about techniques and styles (copycat), not as a motivation for crime. This debate has critical implications for criminal justice academics as calls for policy are regularly made on the bases of research in this area. This article contributes to this literature by presenting detailed, not self-reported, empirical evidence of how media coverage of violent crimes affects crimes perpetrated by drug traffickers at the US-Mexico border, and their crime style. With an empirical model that addresses possible bidirectionalities between criminal violence and media coverage, we tracked 31,676 homicides, its stylistic characteristics, and its coverage by the press. Our results show that when media covers criminal violence it influences the probability that other criminals use similar styles of crimes, but it does not change overall rates of criminal activity. This is evidence against the"trigger" hypothesis, and in favor of “copycat” effects.

Although scholars typically viewed business interests as uniformly opposed to progressive taxation and social spending (Esping-Andersen 1985), researchers in recent decades have increasingly documented systematic variation in business attitudes on social policy (Hall and Soskice 2001, Swenson 2002, Mares 2003, Paster 2013). We use evidence from a survey experiment of firm managers and capital investors to understand how two prominent facets of politics in the developing world (corruption and violence) may be influencing business attitudes toward taxation and social spending. Data will be collected from a convenience sample of members of one of Mexico's largest business association. The association has over 14,000 member companies, employs 4.8 million workers, and is responsible for roughly 30% of the country's GDP.

While numerous studies have revealed systematic inequalities in government-individual relationships and access to state services and resources (Ayres and Siegelman 1995, Butler and Broockman 2011, Doleac and Stein 2013, Giulietti and Vlassopoulos 2015, Milkman et al. 2014, Turner et al. 2013, White et al. 2015), others have found less evidence of racial/ethnic discrimination in access to government programs for the poor (Einstein and Glick 2017). The present study tests for discrimination in online systems for public reporting of suspected fraud in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), examining the effects of being perceived as Latino/immigrant. To do it, we developed a field experiment to test if public assistance fraud control entities respond to public fraud reports differently when those reports are raised by persons who are ostensibly Latina, and ostensibly non-native English speakers. The results shed new light on questions of between-group differences in access to state agencies.

There is a sizable and rapidly expanding literature that explores the impact of post-disaster aid on government support. While some scholars have found that government assistance after a disaster benefits the incumbent, others have shown that the effects of aid on government support are imperceptible or even negative. This article contributes to this unsettled debate by testing the effect of providing government post-disaster assistance on citizen’s perceptions of the government. Our regression discontinuity design of households affected by Tropical Cyclone Winston in Fiji (2016), shows that the type of assistance provided may be an important variable to understand the effects of aid on government support. Fijians receiving a post-disaster cash transfer (CT) are up to 20 percent more likely to be “very satisfied” with the government. The probability further increases if the post-disaster CT is provided along with in-kind food/water benefits or with food/housing vouchers but is not affected if citizens are also encouraged to use their own pension savings to cover for the disaster. This paper provides evidence in favor of a “attentive” citizen, capable of identifying government responses quantitatively and qualitatively.

This paper presents preliminary empirical evidence to show that media attention may influence public displays of brutality by Mexican drug cartels. We defined public displays of brutality as the presence of banners paired with corpses or dismembered bodies at unconcealed crime scenes. Using a data set of 1,736 such instances, we estimated reaction functions to determine whether public displays of brutality became more frequent when drug cartel violence was covered more by the press. Our estimates show that public displays of brutality increase in a statistically significant way during the month following media coverage of similar crimes. We attribute this effect to changes in criminal strategy: increased brutality may be a way for criminals to more effectively deliver intimidating messages to their enemies. Whether increased displays of brutality also amount to increased crime rates, rather than merely increased visibility, is a question that remains to be studied.

A well-functioning press is crucial for sustaining a healthy democracy. While attacks on
journalists occur regularly in many developing countries, previous work has largely
ignored where and why journalists are attacked. Focusing on violence by criminal
organizations (COs) in Mexico, we offer the first systematic, micro-level analysis of the
conditions under which journalists are more likely to be violently targeted. Contrary
to popular belief, our evidence reveals that the presence of large, profitable COs does
not necessarily lead to fatal attacks against the press. Rather, the likelihood of journalists
being killed only increases when rival criminal groups inhabit territories. Rivalry
inhibits COs’ ability to control information leaks to the press, instead creating
incentives for such leaks to be used as weapons to intensify official enforcement
operations against rivals. Without the capacity to informally govern press content,
rival criminals affected by such press coverage are more likely to target journalists.

This article provides empirical evidence showing that when a multilevel government is well coordinated, organized crime can be more effectively controlled. Using a time-variant data set of Mexico’s cocaine markets at the subnational level and Cox proportional-hazards regressions, I show that when Mexico’s democratization decreased the probability of government coordination—the same party governing a municipality at every level of government—drug traffickers were more likely to violate the long-standing informal prohibition on selling cocaine within the country. It was this decrease in government coordination that would set the conditions for a violent war between drug cartels to erupt in the mid-2000s.

Contrary to the predictions of “power sharing” to mitigate ethnic conflicts, multicultural rights recognition can actually increase the frequency of local postelectoral mobilizations. This article demonstrates that the adoption of an ethnic rights regime for electing local government representatives may actually increase conflict if these multicultural laws are not carefully circumscribed to avoid violating human rights. Focusing on the 1995 multicultural rights reforms in Oaxaca, it presents evidence that legal changes purportedly implemented to recognize indigenous rights actually increased postelectoral disputes due to conflicts between county seat communities and peripheral population hamlets over access to funding by the central government. Based on this finding, the article addresses normative implications of “power-sharing” multiculturalism, recommending that multicultural laws be implemented only together with legal mechanisms to solve postelectoral disputes.

Mexican immigration figures have reached their lowest point since 2000. Yet, even if as a whole the United States is receiving fewer Mexican migrants, the opposite is true for cities at the border. In this article, I present evidence to show that this sui generis migration pattern cannot be understood using traditional explanations of migration dynamics. Instead, Mexicans are migrating because of security issues, in fear of drug-related violence and extortion that has spiked since 2008. I provide the first estimate of this migration pattern, showing that 264,692 Mexicans have migrated in fear of organized crime activities. In doing so, I combine the literature on migration dynamics with that on violence and crime, pointing toward ways in which nonstate actors shape actions of state members.

This article explains why homicides related to drug-trafficking operations in Mexico have recently increased by exploring the mechanisms through which this type of violence tends to escalate. It is shown that drug-related violence can be understood as the result of two factors: (a) homicides caused by traffickers battling to take control of a competitive market, and (b) casualties and arrests generated by law enforcement operations against traffickers. Both sources of violence interact causing Mexico to be locked into a “self-reinforcing violent equilibrium” in which incremental increases in traffickers’ confrontations raise the incentives of the government to prosecute traffickers which promote further confrontations with traffickers when, as a result of the detention of drug lords, the remnants of the criminal organization fight each other in successive battles. This article presents quantitative evidence and case studies to assess the importance of the two mechanisms. It uses a unique dataset of recorded communications between drug traffickers and statistics on drug-related homicides.

We develop a framework that uses Web content to obtain quantitative information about a phenomenon that would otherwise require the operation of large scale, expensive intelligence exercises. Exploiting indexed reliable sources such as online newspapers and blogs, we use unambiguous query terms to characterize a complex evolving phenomena and solve a security policy problem: identifying the areas of operation and modus operandi of criminal organizations, in particular, Mexican drug tracking organizations over the last two decades. We validate our methodology by comparing information that is known with certainty with the one we extracted using our framework. We show that our framework is able to use information available on the web to efficiently extract implicit knowledge about criminal organizations. In the scenario of Mexican drug tracking, our findings provide evidence that criminal organizations are more strategic and operate in more differentiated ways than current academic literature thought.

Violent deaths, kidnapping and extortion have spiked in Mexico’s border towns since 2004. Using a formal model and case studies from Mexico, I argue that such phenomena are partially explained by (a) a change in the politics of organized crime, (b) changes in the composition of illegal labor markets, and (c) the incentives generated at legal labor markets. With democratization, Mexico’s government became unable to keep performing its role as central enforcer of territorial boundaries between drug cartels. As cartels became guardians of their own territories, a need to recruitment new cartel members to form private armies emerged. As a result, an illegal labor market so far closed to non blood related individuals opened and modified the incentives to join/remain in the legal labor markets. The outcome was the emergence of a new generation of drug employees that (a) disdain old mafia laws, (b) are more violent and (c) are also more prone to take part of other forms of “entrepreneurial” illegal occupations such as kidnapping and extortion.

By analyzing and gathering quantitative data, this paper presents the first formal economic analysis of the impacts of the drug trafficking industry in Mexico until 2006. The analysis measures the number of drug-traffic employees, the amount of cash and investments generated by the drug-trafficking industry, the monetary costs of violence and corruption, the estimated losses in foreign investment, and the costs generated by local drug abuse. While the authors acknowledge that in some small and less diversified rural communities, drug-traffic cash flows may be helping to alleviate a grinding stage of povertyand underdevelopment, they conclude that the illegal-drug industry generates economic losses of about 4.3 billion dollars annually. Such a high figure is certainly impeding Mexican economic growth and development. Several policy options are considered.