@article {323201,
	title = {How government coordination controlled organized crime: the case of Mexico{\textquoteright}s cocaine markets},
	journal = {Journal of Conflict Resolution},
	volume = {59},
	number = {8},
	year = {2015},
	pages = {1433-1454},
	abstract = {
	This article provides empirical evidence showing that when a multilevel government is well coordinated, organized crime can be more effectively controlled. Using a time-variant data set of Mexico{\textquoteright}s cocaine markets at the subnational level and Cox proportional-hazards regressions, I show that when Mexico{\textquoteright}s democratization decreased the probability of government coordination{\textemdash}the same party governing a municipality at every level of government{\textemdash}drug traffickers were more likely to violate the long-standing informal prohibition on selling cocaine within the country. It was this decrease in government coordination that would set the conditions for a violent war between drug cartels to erupt in the mid-2000s.

},
	url = {https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022002715587052},
	author = {V. R{\'\i}os}
}
