@article {565051,
	title = {Voting on Prices vs. Voting on Quantities in a World Climate Assembly},
	journal = {Research in Economics},
	volume = {71},
	number = {2},
	year = {2017},
	pages = {199-211},
	abstract = {This paper posits the conceptually useful allegory of a futuristic {\textquotedblleft}World Climate Assembly{\textquotedblright} that votes on global carbon emissions via the basic principle of majority rule. Two variants are considered. One is to vote on a universal\&nbsp;price\&nbsp;(or tax) that is internationally harmonized, but the proceeds from which are domestically retained. The other is to vote on the overall\&nbsp;quantity\&nbsp;of total worldwide emissions, which are then distributed for free (via a pre-decided fractional subdivision formula) as individual allowance permits that are subsequently marketed in an international cap-and-trade system. The model of the paper suggests that the majority-voted price is likely to be less distortionary and easier to enact than the majority-voted total quantity of permits. Some possible implications for climate-change negotiations are noted.},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rie.2016.10.004},
	author = {Martin L. Weitzman}
}
