Publications by Year: 2017

2017
Weitzman ML. On a World Climate Assembly and the Social Cost of Carbon. Economica [Internet]. 2017;84 (336) :559-586. Publisher's VersionAbstract

This paper argues that a uniform global tax-like price on carbon emissions, whose revenues each country retains, can provide a focal point for a reciprocal common climate commitment, whereas quantity targets, which do not nearly so readily present such a single focal point, tend to rely ultimately on individual quantity commitments. The paper postulates the conceptually useful allegory of a futuristic ‘World Climate Assembly’ (WCA) that votes for a single worldwide price on carbon emissions via the basic democratic principle of one person, one vote majority rule. A WCA-like uniform price-tax counters self-interest by incentivizing countries or agents to internalize the externality because each WCA agent's higher abatement cost from a higher emissions price is counterbalanced by that agent's extra benefit from inducing all other WCA agents to simultaneously lower their emissions in response to the higher price. The paper derives fresh insights and new simple formulae that relate each emitter's most-preferred world price of carbon to the world ‘social cost of carbon’ (SCC), and further relates the WCA-voted world price of carbon to the world SCC. Some implications are discussed. The overall methodology of the paper is a mixture of mostly classical with some behavioural economics.

Pre-publication version weitzman-2017-economica.pdf
Weitzman ML. A Tight Connection Among Wealth, Income, Sustainability, and Accounting in an Ultra-Simplified Setting. In: National Wealth: What is Missing, Why it Matters. New York: Oxford University Press ; 2017. Publisher's Version Pre-publication version
Weitzman ML. How a Minimum Carbon Price Commitment Might Help to Internalize the Global Warming Externality. In: Global Carbon Pricing The Path to Climate Cooperation. Cambridge: MIT Press ; 2017. pp. 125-148. Publisher's Version Pre-publication version
Weitzman ML. Voting on Prices vs. Voting on Quantities in a World Climate Assembly. Research in Economics [Internet]. 2017;71 (2) :199-211. Publisher's VersionAbstract
This paper posits the conceptually useful allegory of a futuristic “World Climate Assembly” that votes on global carbon emissions via the basic principle of majority rule. Two variants are considered. One is to vote on a universal price (or tax) that is internationally harmonized, but the proceeds from which are domestically retained. The other is to vote on the overall quantity of total worldwide emissions, which are then distributed for free (via a pre-decided fractional subdivision formula) as individual allowance permits that are subsequently marketed in an international cap-and-trade system. The model of the paper suggests that the majority-voted price is likely to be less distortionary and easier to enact than the majority-voted total quantity of permits. Some possible implications for climate-change negotiations are noted.
Pre-publication version
Weitzman ML. On a World Climate Assembly and the Social Cost of Carbon. 2017. Pre-publication version