We propose an account of the movement of GDP volatility in the past 50 years, including the great moderation and its undoing.

Like rational agents, consumers learn, but like myopic agents, consumers respond to recent events more than events that occurred just a few months ago.

Dynamic model of CEO pay featuring manipulation and private saving.  Proposes a reform of CEO compensation to address problems that led to the financial crisis.

Ten puzzling features of the macro-finance data are natural outcomes of a model where investors have time-varying perceptions of the risk of economic disaster.

We build cities "from the bottom up" by clustering areas obtained from high-resolution data, and find that a beautiful Zipf's law for population and for areas, for cities about 12,000 inhabitants in the USA and 5,000 inhabitants in Great Britain.

Take a production economy which has good business cycle properties:  to fix its asset pricing properties (e.g. to have a high and volatile returns to equities), add disaster risk in the right places, i.e. "disasterize" this economy.

To estimate a Pareto exponent with an OLS regression, it's best to specify it with log(Rank-1/2)=a-b log(Size), and use the standard error s.e. (b)=b (2/n)^0.5, as OLS standard errors strongly biased.

Risk aversion causes distortions in talent allocation--risky firms hire less talented CEOs.  Tractable market equilibrium allowing calibration of costs of corporate governance.

Develops a framework that delivers tractable (i.e. closed-form) optimal contracts, with few restrictions on the utility function, or noise distribution.

Brief, non-technical summary of the framework for achieving tractable incentive contracts developed in "Tractability in Incentive Contracting" and used in "The Effect of Risk on the CEO Market and Dynamic CEO Compensation."

The young and the old make the most mistakes, and people reach maximal performance at age 53.

Most "laws" in economics are power laws:  a survey of theory and empirics on power laws.

A neoclassical model of both total salary and incentives quantitatively explains various apparently paradoxical features of the data, such as the negative empirical scaling of the Jensen-Murphy incentives with firm size and their seemingly low level.

The paper explains how, by "twisting" regular processes, simple closed forms for stocks and bonds obtain systematically. 

We present a tractable way to price options on any bond portfolios, including both caps and swaptions, using LG processes.

A short survey on power laws.

A tractable model of CEO pay.  An upshot:  the six-fold rise in CEO pay between 1980 and 2003 can be fully attributed to the six-fold increase in market capitalization of large companies during that period.