Publications

2015
Su Y, Hsiao W. Improving Health Measures: Evidence from a List Experiment, Cognitive Interviews, and a Vignette Study. Global Health and Population. 2015;Doctor of Science. su_dissertation_abstract.pdf
Su Y. Direct Questioning or List-based Questioning: Evidence from a Survey Experiment on Intravenous Infusion Use and Smoking in China, in 12th Midwest International Economic Development Conference. Madison, Wisconsin ; 2015. list_experiment_yanfang_su_harvard_2015.pdf
Zhou Z, Su Y, Campbell B, Zhou Z, Gao J, Yu Q, Chen J, Pan Y. The Financial Impact of the ‘Zero-Markup Policy for Essential Drugs’ on Patients in County Hospitals in Western Rural China. PLoS OnePLoS One. 2015;10 :e0121630. 2_zhou_su_drug_policy_plos_one.pdf
Zhou Z, Su Y, Campbell B, Zhou Z, ianmin Gao, Yu Q, Chen J, Pan Y. The impact of China's Zero-Markup Drug Policy on county hospital revenue and government subsidy levels. Journal of Asian Public PolicyJournal of Asian Public Policy. 2015. zhou_su_drug_policy_original_manuscript.pdf
2012
Su Y. An Inverted Pyramid: Three-tier Public Financing for Health in Nigeria. Harvard College Global Health ReviewHarvard College Global Health Review. 2012;IV. nigeria_yanfang_2012.pdf
周忠良, 苏延芳, 高建民, 周志英, 徐玲, 张耀光. 农村居民卫生服务需求弹性研究. 中国卫生经济. 2012;30 (12) :14-16. nong_cun_ju_min_wei_sheng_fu_wu_xu_qiu_dan_xing_yan_jiu_.pdf
2007
Su Y, Cui Z. Application of Looting Models: State-owned Enterprise Bankruptcy by Policy or by Law. School of Public Policy and Management. 2007;MA.Abstract

There are two approaches to bankrupt State-owned Enterprise (SOE): bankruptcy by policy or by law. This research deals with theoretical questions and practical problems in SOE bankruptcy, especially the relationship among bankruptcy policy, bankruptcy law and strategic bankruptcy.

Theoretically, Hoff-Stiglitz Model and Akerlof-Romer Model are extended. It is indicated that implementation of bankruptcy policy increases the possibility in strategetic bankruptcy: First, the equilibrium of law supply, looting capacity and law demand is explained in macro perspective; Second, rational decision of strategic bankruptcy is testified in micro perspective. This research reveals that dilemma of bankruptcy policy is inevitable: on one hand, SOE with heavy historical burden would face serious problems such as social movement in bankruptcy without subsidy; on the other hand, SOE and local government could get undeserved subsidy even loot the enterprise with bankruptcy policy. The analysis of micro decision making mechanism demonstrates that the controller of SOE concerns with residual income instead of the maximum of enterprise value. While maximizing residual income is implemented in strategetic bankruptcy, looting and minus externality would occur.

Strategic bankruptcy cases in Chengtong Group emperically corroborate former theoretical analyses in two aspects: the change of power and of capital flow in strategic bankruptcy as well as the relationship of government, controller, worker and creditor as stake-holders. Those cases also imply that who gets what and how in the process of strategic bankruptcy and that the effect of bankruptcy policy is different from the purpose.

Extended Hoff-Stiglitz Model showes strategic bankruptcy reduces the demand of bankruptcy law. According to termination of bankruptcy policy in 2008 and the process of bankruptcy law legislation, the further research in need and regulation in preventing SOE from being looted are presented.

 

 

Keywords: Bankruptcy Policy    Strategetic Bankruptcy    Looting Akerlof-Romer Model

Hoff -Stiglitz Mode

苏延芳, 崔之元. 掠夺模型的应用:国有企业政策性破产和依法破产. 公共管理学院. 2007;公共管理硕士.Abstract

中国国有企业破产有两种方式:政策性破产和依法破产。本研究以政治经济学范式认知国有企业破产中涉及的问题,主要应用两个掠夺模型分析政策性破产、依法破产和策略性破产之间的相互关系。

本研究在理论层面上,运用拓展Hoff -Stiglitz模型从宏观角度分析了掠夺能力强化机制,其后从中国国有企业特征出发,拓展运用了Akerlof-Romer模型从微观角度分析了策略性破产的理性决策过程,说明在中国国有企业政策性破产的实施增加策略性破产的可能性。研究结果显示,政策性破产的行政主导特征使得救济功能和引致掠夺功能共存,从而难以避免政策性破产的两难困境:没有政策性破产,背负沉重历史包袱的国有企业将在破产中面临大量职工安置问题,引发群体性事件甚至是社会动荡;有了政策性破产,企业领导层和地方政府将有可能策略性地得到不该有的补贴和救济,甚至去掠夺企业。微观机制的分析更清晰地表明,企业控制者关心的是掠夺收入和经营收入的比较而不仅仅是企业价值最大化,而且当最大化剩余收入以策略性破产的形式实现时会产生掠夺以及负外部性。

在实证层面,中国诚通集团破产案例印证了上述的理论分析,揭示策略性破产企业的权力流动和资本流动以及政府方、经理人、职工、债权人关系,揭示企业控制者如何策略性致使企业亏损,通过破产实现剩余索取权最大化,同时显示政策性破产政策的政策结果与政策意图的背离。

以上从理论和实证两个方面指出政治环境对经济行为的影响,同时需要指出的是经济行为对政治环境的影响。拓展的Hoff-Stiglitz模型分析进一步表明掠夺行为降低了法治需求,《破产法》立法进程之缓慢与策略性破产存在相关性,策略性破产以及其他掠夺行为降低了对《破产法》的需求。

最后,针对2008年政策性破产的终止和《破产法》的立法,提出需要进一步研究的问题和掠夺规避方式。

 

关键词:政策性破产    策略性破产   掠夺   Akerlof-Romer模型   Hoff -Stiglitz模型


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