Su Y, Cui Z. Application of Looting Models: State-owned Enterprise Bankruptcy by Policy or by Law. School of Public Policy and Management. 2007;MA.Abstract

There are two approaches to bankrupt State-owned Enterprise (SOE): bankruptcy by policy or by law. This research deals with theoretical questions and practical problems in SOE bankruptcy, especially the relationship among bankruptcy policy, bankruptcy law and strategic bankruptcy.

Theoretically, Hoff-Stiglitz Model and Akerlof-Romer Model are extended. It is indicated that implementation of bankruptcy policy increases the possibility in strategetic bankruptcy: First, the equilibrium of law supply, looting capacity and law demand is explained in macro perspective; Second, rational decision of strategic bankruptcy is testified in micro perspective. This research reveals that dilemma of bankruptcy policy is inevitable: on one hand, SOE with heavy historical burden would face serious problems such as social movement in bankruptcy without subsidy; on the other hand, SOE and local government could get undeserved subsidy even loot the enterprise with bankruptcy policy. The analysis of micro decision making mechanism demonstrates that the controller of SOE concerns with residual income instead of the maximum of enterprise value. While maximizing residual income is implemented in strategetic bankruptcy, looting and minus externality would occur.

Strategic bankruptcy cases in Chengtong Group emperically corroborate former theoretical analyses in two aspects: the change of power and of capital flow in strategic bankruptcy as well as the relationship of government, controller, worker and creditor as stake-holders. Those cases also imply that who gets what and how in the process of strategic bankruptcy and that the effect of bankruptcy policy is different from the purpose.

Extended Hoff-Stiglitz Model showes strategic bankruptcy reduces the demand of bankruptcy law. According to termination of bankruptcy policy in 2008 and the process of bankruptcy law legislation, the further research in need and regulation in preventing SOE from being looted are presented.



Keywords: Bankruptcy Policy    Strategetic Bankruptcy    Looting Akerlof-Romer Model

Hoff -Stiglitz Mode

苏延芳, 崔之元. 掠夺模型的应用:国有企业政策性破产和依法破产. 公共管理学院. 2007;公共管理硕士.Abstract


本研究在理论层面上,运用拓展Hoff -Stiglitz模型从宏观角度分析了掠夺能力强化机制,其后从中国国有企业特征出发,拓展运用了Akerlof-Romer模型从微观角度分析了策略性破产的理性决策过程,说明在中国国有企业政策性破产的实施增加策略性破产的可能性。研究结果显示,政策性破产的行政主导特征使得救济功能和引致掠夺功能共存,从而难以避免政策性破产的两难困境:没有政策性破产,背负沉重历史包袱的国有企业将在破产中面临大量职工安置问题,引发群体性事件甚至是社会动荡;有了政策性破产,企业领导层和地方政府将有可能策略性地得到不该有的补贴和救济,甚至去掠夺企业。微观机制的分析更清晰地表明,企业控制者关心的是掠夺收入和经营收入的比较而不仅仅是企业价值最大化,而且当最大化剩余收入以策略性破产的形式实现时会产生掠夺以及负外部性。





关键词:政策性破产    策略性破产   掠夺   Akerlof-Romer模型   Hoff -Stiglitz模型

苏延芳, 肖兴志. 反事实研究: 放松规制与中国航空网络的演变. 财经研究. 2006;32 (3) :103-113. counterfactual_analysis_deregulation_and_changes_of_aviation_network_in_china.pdf
苏延芳. 重叠共识: 全球视角的中国之路. 中国社会科学院研究生院学报. 2006;(5) :15-20. zhong_die_gong_shi_quan_qiu_shi_jiao_de_zhong_guo_zhi_lu_.pdf
Su Y, Xiao X. Counterfactual Analysis: Deregulation and Changes of Aviation Network in China. The Study of Finance and Economics. 2006;3 :103-13.Abstract

Abstract: The rule of aviation industry was discussed through analyzing the evolvement of US aviation network, and the tendency of China aviation industry was predicted. First, history of aviation deregulation in US was reviewed, then two theory models were introduced: one was a simple model about air lines prevalence ratio of in the aviation network, the other was about the cost comparison between the fully connected (FC) network and the hub-spoke (HS) network. In the further analysis, the applicability of FC network and HS network was illustrated by using a simulated sample to compare the network externality and the transportation cost between FC network and HS network, then the present situation of FC network and HS network in China was explored according to the market research of China regional aviation after that, counterfactual method is discussed. At last, relative policy suggestions are proposed.