Identification and Escalation in Irregular War

Abstract: The inflammatory effect of large-scale indiscriminate violence has become an article of faith among practitioners and scholars of irregular war. Yet such practices frequently occur, often devoid of any discernible coercive logic. Why? Using a mathematical model of punishment and cooperation, I show that successful coercion is difficult to achieve in irregular conflicts, particularly for governments fighting guerrilla opponents.  The identification problem -- the inability to correctly locate and punish one's opponents -- compels the side with an informational disadvantage to gain coercive leverage by escalating violence. Contrary to conventional wisdom, this diminished power to hurt'' neither moderates the intensity of violence in equilibrium, nor assures defeat in continued fighting. Rather, the identification problem creates powerful incentives to escalate -- particularly where a combatant cannot offset this disadvantage by offering generous rewards to potential supporters. I evaluate these propositions empirically using micro-level conflict data from Russia's North Caucasus.