Feher and Sobchak start their essay with the observation that “the baseline expectation of how learning would occur” has changed since their own undergraduate experiences.  They argue that games and simulations can provide “insight into real-world decision-making processes” and offer a more direct bridge between theory and practice than typical lectures.  Feher and Sobchak’s discussion also highlights some “key ingredients” to creating effective games and simulations.  In brief, they identify three key components to an effective simulation: students’ good-faith role-playing, the addition of insufficient information and time constraints that can stoke interpersonal conflict and debate, and the creation of “an all-knowing control cell” (that is, a professor and/or teaching assistants) that can script the scenario and answer questions as they arise.  This essay is useful for its account of the authors’ experience in running multiple simulations: the Cuban Missile Crisis, the South China Sea crisis (a maritime crisis prompted by an accident that involved the U.S. navy and a Kenyan cargo carrying Chinese toxic waste), and a UN-sponsored climate change conference, a larger simulation (“SIMULEX”) for the International Security Studies Program at the Fletcher School. Feher and Sobchak conclude that “games and simulations [will] help prepare the next generation [of leaders] to do their best even in the worst circumstances.”

In the post-Cold War era, U.S. engagement toward China was a naïve & misguided strategy. While it facilitated China’s rise, it did not achieve U.S. goals (liberalization, China as "responsible stakeholder"). It's time for balancing.

In spite of all the protestations from mainstream experts and practitioners, Trump’s foreign policy agenda—even though it may differ sharply from recent tradition—is not new, bizarre, or even entirely radical. Many of the same proposals have actually been around in the academic and policy worlds for several years and advocated by the so—called "Neorealists."